School reforms bring into question democratic traditions

  • 2009-10-01
  • By Arta Ankrava
RIGA - The growing public discussion in Latvia on the need for a president that is elected by the people directly places the issue of democratic stability here in the Baltics, and even Scandinavia, in context. Is Latvia an exception in the region, when it comes to discussion of constitutional change that could potentially mold a new model of democracy? And more recently, how is this reflecting on areas such as higher education?

As mentioned last week, political analyst Fareed Zakaria's argument is that for a democracy to be stable, it has to be introduced to a country in a period of relative prosperity, i.e. one with a GDP per capita income of approximately $3,000 's $6,000. This was the case in many European countries before World War I, as the average per capita GDP rose to $4,800 in 1913, he writes in The Future of Freedom.  In Sweden, for example, it was approximately $4,400 that year and was almost $7,700 in 1945, data from the University of Stockholm shows.

An indicator considerably lower than the aforementioned, say, a per capita GDP income of under $1,500 at the time of establishment of a democratic regime, has a 'life expectancy' of just eight years, Zakaria argues, referencing an extensive study by Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi in 1997. This obviously makes new democracies volatile and prone to instability, and consequently develops a need for stronger and more decisive leadership, echoed in the demur questioning of constitutional order in Latvia and elsewhere in the Baltics. More recently, we even see a questioning, or rethinking, of the education systems.

Discussion on increased presidential powers, or even a reorganization of the constitution to form a presidential republic, has remained largely in the public sphere in the Baltic and other ex-socialist states in Europe. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin wall and emergence of popular movements, these new states are still giving democracy a chance, save for a couple.
Zakaria writes that in 1989, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were at the higher end of the transitional per capita GDP range, tipping $6,000. This made for a faster consolidation of democracy in central Europe, while countries like Albania and Romania struggled, being in the lower tier of the 'required' income.

According to data from the Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, Lithuania and Estonia had approximately the same GDP per capita in 1990 as did Poland. Latvia, however, had a slightly higher indicator, of roughly $9,600, at the time. By the early 1990s though, Latvia was in approximately the same position, sporting a GDP of $6,000 per capita. Even Finland experienced a slight drop in its GDP, attributed to the fallout of trade relations with Russia. Nations like Sweden and Denmark did not show such changes, proving their strong economies resilient to even major political and economic overhauls in the region.

It must be mentioned that a certain income standard in itself is not a guarantee of a liberal democracy, beside historical and cultural factors; the money, quite simply, must be earned. It must be wealth created in markets, the cornerstone of capitalism. Without it, business, albeit seemingly successful, remains too closely linked with the state, thus impeding its own, as well as democracy's development. The protection of individual interests matters.

There is currently talk nonetheless, that in the higher education system, individual, private institutions cannot compete with state universities, so it would be best to unite them into a single, state university. This trend is emerging not only in Latvia and Lithuania, but also in Iceland.

How such a scenario could affect the education system, for example, was brought up in last week's conference at the University of Latvia 's 'University in a small country and global world.' Professor Benediktas Juodka, rector of Vilnius University, spoke of plans to unite several Lithuanian universities into a single state-run institution. This higher education establishment would be run by people appointed by the Ministry of Education. How this would reflect on the development of democracy and free thought remains a tricky issue, not easily accepted by Lithuania's academia. Such reforms could result in university rectors becoming political figures, possibly compromising the integrity of independent thought in academia.

A similar development is occurring in Iceland, where in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, speculation rises about possible unification of universities. However, the strong foundation of a democratic tradition and a comparatively much higher GDP per capita places Iceland far beyond the democratic 'risk zone,' even given the dramatic consequences of the economic crisis. At the same conference, head of the School of Business at the University of Iceland, Professor Ingjaldur Hannibalsson, argued that such change would probably be beneficial in his country, as it would allow for greater pooling of human, as well as financial, resources.

There is risk attached, however, to too literal an interpretation of another small nation's successful scenario, be it conglomerating brainpower and economic resources, or considering constitutional change. There exists a plethora of other, no less significant factors to consider. Albeit Scandinavia is a great example of sustaining democracy, equality and free thought, many of its experiences cannot be adopted as easily here, mainly due to the Baltics' inconsistent record in the former factors as well as to its specific economic conditions.