VILNIUS - Lithuania’s defence chief Raimundas Vaiksnoras said the country’s 2027 budget must maintain or increase current defence funding to sustain the pace of military development.
Lithuania has allocated 5.38 percent of its gross domestic product to defence this year. While politicians have not named specific figures for 2025, they maintain that funding will not drop below 5 percent of gross domestic product.
"If we want our projects and the development of our defence capabilities to continue without having to abandon anything just because of a missing euro, we must maintain the same level. Not less, and perhaps even more," the General said in an interview.
"We all understand that doing more with less is difficult, perhaps even impossible," he added.
The National Audit Office reported last week that while defence funding is growing rapidly, the procurement system for weapons and military equipment is failing to keep pace with military needs. According to the office, the share of failed procurements in the defence sector has increased 2.5 times in two years, and decision-making needs to be more efficient.
According to the military chief, the biggest problem is bureaucracy.
"Bureaucracy kills speed. Sometimes we have good intentions, but in the end, we have little to boast about or integrate into our defence. I am not throwing stones at anyone; we must understand this is a systemic issue that needs to change. That is presumably why people get paid-to come up with a mechanism," Vaiksnoras said.
OTHER INTERVIEW TOPICS:
* Drone threats and the NASAMS system deployed on the outskirts of Vilnius;
* Intelligence on potential Russian provocations and Kremlin military capabilities;
* Transformation of the NATO air policing mission into air defence with broader mandates;
* Positive news regarding the rotation of US troops in Lithuania;
* Progress of the Kapciamiestis training ground and real forest clearing that has not sparked local outrage;
* Mandatory conscription for women is not a priority.
- DRONE INCURSIONS INTO EASTERN NATO COUNTRIES CONTINUE. THE LAST SUCH INCIDENT IN LITHUANIA WAS RECORDED THREE MONTHS AGO. IT IS LIKELY ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE IT HAPPENS AGAIN. HOW HAS THE MILITARY STRENGTHENED AIR DEFENCE DURING THIS PERIOD?
- As long as there is a war near us, very close to the border, no one can say it will not happen again-whether intentionally or unintentionally. Regarding the recent incident where a drone entered Latvian territory, let us assume it was diverted by electronic warfare measures from either Russia or Belarus. However, Ukrainians have the right to defend themselves, even by attacking and destroying sensitive infrastructure on Russian territory.
Such incursions are inevitable, and we have seen this for over a year. Our response is (...) perhaps we have not achieved everything yet as we are still in the procurement process, but detection has been strengthened. We now have visibility much further out, especially at low altitudes, which is crucial for detecting small or low-flying objects.
The Latvian example showed that we tracked and saw the incursion-our air force, just like Latvia's, saw it from much further away and could prepare. Consequently, Baltic air policing was scrambled in time from the Siauliai air base and destroyed the drone in a safe location where falling debris would not cause injury or damage.
- DOES THIS MEAN THAT IF A DRONE ENTERS LITHUANIA, IT WOULD BE DESTROYED IN THE AIR?
- Yes. There are always nuances considered by the operational duty officer and the pilot, who assess the threat and potential damage. We are still living in peacetime, and sometimes allowing a flight through is a better decision than having falling debris kill someone.
These are hypothetical scenarios, but our stance is that we must destroy them; we cannot allow anything in-regardless of which side it comes from, whether they are Russian drones, Ukrainian, or under a false flag. Any unauthorised drone is a threat to us. If a case similar to Latvia or Estonia occurred, we would destroy it in safe areas. We have those safe areas and flexible spaces, having coordinated a system with the Ministry of Transport where we can close certain airspaces within seconds.
You must understand, it is peacetime, summer, and many other objects are flying: gliders, and private ultralight aircraft from border airfields. All these things can interfere with a successful operation, so it is vital to ensure the safety of what is in the air.
Regarding qualitative change, as planned and promised, we have replaced our RBS-70 short-range system with NASAMS, and today the approaches to Vilnius are protected much more effectively and with greater range.
- THIS SEEMS TO BE A RECENT DECISION, AS YOU HAD NOT MENTIONED IT PREVIOUSLY.
- We did not want to boast; one should act first and talk later. The plan was in place since spring when we knew we were receiving a second NASAMS battery. It took some time to master it and bring it into service, but today we have a much more effective system.
Critics may say NASAMS is not the tool where expensive missiles should shoot down cheap drones, but until we have other means, it is perhaps the most flexible tool-similar to the missiles used by Baltic air defence fighters. They are expensive, but they are the most effective tool today because you can catch and destroy that drone anywhere in Lithuanian territory. NASAMS gives us speed, range, and accuracy.
- SINCE THIS HAS ALREADY HAPPENED, CAN YOU REVEAL SINCE WHEN NASAMS HAS BEEN PROTECTING THE SKIES NEAR VILNIUS?
- Let us leave that veil slightly closed. The exact date is not the most important point; what matters is that the approaches or areas where unauthorised drones could potentially enter based on our historical data are now more effectively protected.
- DOES NASAMS COVER ALL OF VILNIUS OR JUST THE APPROACHES?
- The desire is for the entire territory of Lithuania to be covered, but available means only allow for certain areas. I do not want to disclose more today for operational security reasons, but I can say we see better, detect better, and our destruction or neutralisation capabilities are also much improved.
- YOU PREVIOUSLY SAID THE MILITARY SHOULD RECEIVE DRONE INTERCEPTOR PROTOTYPES BY LATE SUMMER OR EARLY AUTUMN. HAVE THEY ARRIVED?
- I wish they had, but they are not here yet, and I cannot state the plans today as they are in the procurement process. It is likely we should have them in the autumn, at least the first test batches to begin testing and integration.
- LITHUANIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE RECENTLY CONFIRMED DATA SUGGESTING RUSSIA IS CONSIDERING ATTACKS ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE BALTIC REGION USING UKRAINIAN-STYLE DRONES. US MEDIA, CITING THEIR OWN INTELLIGENCE, SAYS SUCH A LIMITED ATTACK COULD OCCUR AS EARLY AS THIS AUTUMN. WHAT DO YOU KNOW ABOUT THIS?
- We know as much as everyone else. This information was likely leaked to the public for a reason-probably as a preventive measure to show Russia that we know, we see, and they will not be able to blame someone else.
The increased number of sabotage cases in Europe is certainly worrying. We see Russian special services, possibly using bribed locals or tourists, trying to exert influence and intimidate businesses and the defence industry producing items for Ukraine to force countries to withdraw support.
This has been happening and will continue; the question is how we react. The response involves strengthening our strategic objects, especially energy sites, and supporting the Public Security Service. Of course, every company and organisation is also responsible for protecting its assets and implementing certain measures. Our state-owned enterprises are doing this successfully, consulting with the military on specific measures.
I would say Russia's intimidation tactics have not changed; this is nothing new to us. These threats were known months ago, and the information is just being refined with more details as the intelligence process never stops. We mostly use the same database as all other NATO countries.
- DOES LITHUANIAN INTELLIGENCE HAVE INFORMATION THAT A SABOTAGE ACTION OR KINETIC PROVOCATION COULD BE CARRIED OUT THIS AUTUMN?
- I cannot speculate. It is the prerogative of intelligence to provide reports, and for our leaders to decide how much to disclose. We prepare every day. There is no firm data today that something will or will not happen, but that could change tomorrow. This is part of the process, and everything depends on the readiness of our national institutions to thwart these threats. I cannot comment much more as I do not want to speculate, and reports are usually classified. When we know more, it will be communicated.
- WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY COMPARED TO THE PERIOD BEFORE THE WAR IN UKRAINE?
- A paradox has been observed over the past year: their war industry is so tuned that they manage to produce more while at war than they did before. It is difficult to talk about efficiency-Ukrainians could say more about how much they intercept-but the production of armoured vehicles, missiles, drones, and ammunition is carried out in sufficiently large volumes. This makes it difficult, even with all our Western support for Ukraine, to bring them to a peace agreement or a ceasefire. The Russians know they still have an advantage over what we provide to Ukraine.
Regarding mobilisation, they have started to face a shortage of people. Even if they produce many weapons, Russia is three times larger than Ukraine in terms of population, so they have managed to mobilise a certain number of volunteers so far. However, we see they are starting to lack people-they are struggling to replace the numbers being killed or neutralised each month. This leads to talk that a mobilisation could be announced late this year or next year to fill gaps in units.
In my assessment, they have already started and in some places are halfway through building new units, especially near the border with Finland. They are currently empty, so the goal is likely to fill them. In Kaliningrad, infantry has likely decreased tenfold; it is mostly conscripts now as the mass is sent straight to the front. These resources are visibly shrinking, so they must make other decisions on how to fill their crews, using incentives or force.
- LET US TALK ABOUT LITHUANIA. YOUR TERM HAS NOT EVEN REACHED THE HALFWAY POINT, YET YOU ARE ALREADY WORKING WITH A FOURTH GOVERNMENT. NEW MINISTERS COME WITH THEIR OWN VISIONS FOR CAPABILITY PRIORITIES. THE NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE NOTED THAT THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM IS FAILING TO MEET NEEDS, CITING CHANGING PRIORITIES AS ONE REASON. IS THE POLITICAL DIRECTION FOR MILITARY DEVELOPMENT CLEAR TO YOU?
- You see, while one might observe that things aren't happening or are happening incorrectly, I don't see it that way. Every new government has its programme and priorities, but overall defence priorities do not change. We are still investing in hosting the German brigade, developing our division, and air defence has moved up the list, but that was also a priority of the previous government. Total defence through universal conscription remains as well. I would say the order might shift, but the principle remains.
We continue to support the services of the Ministry of the Interior, such as the Border Guard and the Public Security Service. I believe these processes are managed; we understand where we are going. My wish is for these directions to be maintained, but that requires corresponding funding.
Discussions on funding are starting this summer. I have heard public reports on our economic indicators and what might be allocated to various ministries. The debate now is about whether to prioritise education, the economy, or elsewhere, but defence must remain a top priority because we have a very clear plan. Otherwise, if defence is not funded as planned, we will have to give something up.
That would be my greatest concern. We all understand that doing more with less is difficult or impossible. Therefore, the military actively submits proposals to the ministry on where accents should be placed to ensure that funding at least does not decrease.
- RETURNING TO THE NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE'S REMARKS, WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE MAIN REASON THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM IS FAILING TO MEET NEEDS?
- It is a complex issue. The biggest challenge-and I have said this before-is that our processes and procedures should be simplified rather than complicated. Sometimes, in an attempt to simplify, even more safeguards are added.
We all understand the need to use defence funds as transparently as possible so that not a single cent is wasted; no one wants scandals. We are not just soldiers but citizens; we understand this is taxpayers' money.
This is not just a Lithuanian problem; it is likely an issue for the entire EU and perhaps even the US. Procuring necessary equipment takes time because you have to prove everything. Particularly in public procurement, there are many safeguards, and every comma and dot lengthens the process. It is the task of our politicians and the government to simplify these laws while maintaining control mechanisms.
It is easy to say but hard to do. As a commander, I would say risk-taking should also be a factor, because you cannot achieve speed with zero risk. There must be a balance. I do not conduct procurements; the military provides the requirements. Bureaucracy kills speed. We sometimes have good intentions but little to show for it in the end. I am not throwing stones; it is a systemic issue that needs changing. That is what people are paid for-to design the mechanism.
- REGARDING AIR DEFENCE, A FEW YEARS AGO THE MILITARY URGED NOT TO OVERESTIMATE DRONES, AS STRATEGIC GOALS ARE ACHIEVED WITH HEAVY WEAPONRY. HOW RELEVANT IS THIS VIEW NOW, GIVEN THE MASS DRONE ATTACKS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE?
- Nothing has changed; the classics remain. The war in Ukraine shows that battles still involve armour and artillery. One must evaluate many factors. Yes, the drone has changed the face of battle significantly-distances are greater and soldier-to-soldier combat is rarer-but the drone is still a supplementary element.
The multi-domain joint operations concept remains clear, connecting all branches of the forces. When there is synergy-air defence, good intelligence, good communications-we can detect the enemy, strike deep, and destroy their reserves, thereby preserved our territory.
Armour is necessary in any case, because as long as a soldier is on the ground, you control the territory. You cannot control territory with drones. You can do it for a time, but eventually, someone must occupy and hold it. That is the basic starting point.
Looking through the Lithuanian lens, we are not standing aside. We are integrating the best practices into the Lithuanian military. We had training in the spring, and the Gryphon exercise in September and October will focus on drones. "Hostile forces" will be formed to challenge commanders to make the right decisions. By incorporating flying, ground, and surface drones, we will become more effective.
- IN OTHER WORDS, YOU SEE NO NEED TO STOP PROCUREMENTS RELATED TO ARMOUR, AS IN ESTONIA, TO REDISTRIBUTE THOSE FUNDS TO AIR DEFENCE?
- There are two things here. It is no secret that for contracts already signed, even if you stop, you still have to pay. There is no point in even discussing it. However, we can adapt the lessons learned by the Ukrainians. Every time, we think with force commanders about how to implement new experience.
- FOLLOWING THE NATO SUMMIT, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE AIR POLICING MISSION IN THE BALTIC STATES IS BEING TRANSFORMED INTO AIR DEFENCE. WHAT DOES THIS CHANGE?
- For 20-plus years, we had air policing: fighters scramble, identify, and assess. Policing is mostly identification. However, after the incident over Estonian islands where two fighters violated the airspace, you realise NATO must have tools. You don't necessarily have to shoot at everything immediately, but after a warning, if incidents repeat, there should be a possibility to show force-to show who the masters are here.
I don't think we will immediately start shooting at aircraft violating the airspace, as errors occur-the Russians themselves suffer from GPS jamming. However, it is a very strong statement, a deterrent to show the other side that we have the capability not only to identify and escort but also to destroy.
- BUT NATO FIGHTERS ALREADY SHOOT DOWN DRONES THAT ENTER BALTIC TERRITORY. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE?
- We are talking about Russian aviation, not drones. Drones are unmanned, and shooting them down has consequences only if debris hits the ground. In a hypothetical scenario where someone violates our airspace-a fighter or bomber, intentionally or unintentionally-we must have the capability to shoot it down. It is a show of our resolve. I would draw a parallel with the removal of the constitutional ban on nuclear weapons in our region. It doesn't mean nuclear weapons will suddenly appear in Lithuania, but we are removing restrictions should they be needed.
- WILL MORE ALLIED FIGHTERS OR GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS BE DEPLOYED IN LITHUANIA AFTER THIS STEP?
- Practically, perhaps not, but there are already significant amounts in the region. It is very good that we managed to maintain the number of fighters not only at the Siauliai air base but also in Estonia. However, it gives the SACEUR more flexibility because aviation is very fast. Relocating assets between European airfields is a matter of hours. Decisions made in Ankara help NATO leadership concentrate capabilities in specific locations more flexibly.
- HOPES WERE PINNED ON THE ROTATIONAL AIR DEFENCE MODEL, BUT CAPABILITIES ARE STILL NOT REGULARLY DEPLOYED IN THE BALTICS. HAS THIS MODEL STILL GOT A FUTURE?
- Physically, it is currently difficult to establish a rotational model here. Yes, there were several exercises where other countries deployed their assets, but it was not a symbolic presence. Their presence immediately interacted with our air forces, focusing on integration and understanding how to quickly plug systems-whether Patriot, IRIS-T, or SAMP/T-into our common air defence system.
It was never just a show mission to calm the residents. Action is happening in various formats; we are talking to countries that have long-range air defence so they can visit more often for exercises, but the goal remains a rotational basis. We have medium-range NASAMS, which is fine, but ballistic missiles can only be taken down by Patriot-type long-range systems.
- INFRASTRUCTURE IS VITAL FOR ALLIED DEPLOYMENTS. THE RAIL BALTICA PROJECT IS DELAYED AND NOW EXPECTED TO MISS THE 2030 DEADLINE. INTELLIGENCE SUGGESTS RUSSIA WILL BE CAPABLE OF TESTING NATO UNITY BY THEN. DO YOU SEE SECURITY RISKS IN THIS DELAY?
- I wouldn't link it directly, but any infrastructure that improves military mobility influences the speed of deployment. There are alternatives. The German 37th Brigade and the Americans have tested this. We use roads, ferries, and sea transport.
But yes, this could be a bottleneck that needs solving. It is unfortunate that it is delayed. I don't want to sound political, but things rarely happen earlier or faster here; there are always delays. I don't follow the specific reasons as it is not my responsibility, but military mobility is very important to us.
Does it have a big impact? In the long term, perhaps, but today I don't see it. Capabilities must arrive and will arrive much earlier than any real incident could occur, primarily to deter and show the resolve of all allies to defend Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland.
- WHAT SHOULD NEXT YEAR'S MILITARY BUDGET BE?
- We have already submitted our calculations for 2025. The 5 percent of GDP we discussed was only a minimum threshold, and there is a commitment that it should be between 5 and 6 percent.
I understand the budget needs balancing, but living in such a complex geopolitical situation with so many provocations and worrying messages about Russia's ability to do something bad even before 2030, we must focus on defence. The logic is simple: if we don't pay enough attention to defence, all other spheres and initiatives could be reduced to zero if an enemy attacks. It is a balance...
- BUT WHAT IS THE SPECIFIC FIGURE?
- Without being specific, if we want to maintain the pace of developing the division and air defence, it must be no less than what is allocated this year.
- DO YOU HAVE INFORMATION THAT IT WILL BE?
- The discussion is ongoing. Since it is in the planning stage, it would be unprofessional to discuss what hasn't happened yet. There are no final numbers, only forecasts. I hear what his Excellency the President and my Minister are saying, and I hold the same position. If we want our projects not to stop or have to be abandoned just because of a missing euro, we must maintain the same level. Not less, and perhaps even more.
- IN RECENT YEARS, WHEN MINISTERS EXPLAINED WHY THEIR SECTORS DIDN'T GET MORE FUNDING, THE MAIN ARGUMENT WAS THAT THE MONEY WAS NEEDED FOR DEFENCE. SOME SOLDIERS FEEL THIS PITS SOCIETY AGAINST THE MILITARY. WHAT IS YOUR TAKE?
- There is some truth to that. When we communicate in the public sphere, we must be careful. Saying "we are giving money to defence, so we have no money for salaries" creates a negative tone.
It is not my place to teach, but strategic communication should be handled carefully to avoid creating friction. Automatically, we in the military are put in a position where we look like parasites who just want beautiful toys while everything else is neglected. Defence is everyone's business-whether it is culture, education, or healthcare.
Look at the Israeli model-the whole state and society knows where they live and what to expect from their neighbours. Everything we do should be oriented toward how we protect ourselves, rather than living as if it were 10-15 years ago when everything was peaceful. Once we achieve this understanding, no one will have questions.
Returning to your question, yes, it sounds strange to me as a commander and a citizen when it is said that we cannot do something because of defence spending.
- DO YOU HAVE MORE SPECIFIC NEWS ABOUT THE RETURN OF US TROOP ROTATIONS TO LITHUANIA?
- I do. But I cannot say. I can only say publicly that the Americans keep their word. The expectation to have an official decision by late June or July was slightly delayed due to internal political matters in America. But my information is positive: US troops will be in Lithuania as promised.
- IS THE DATE CLEAR?
- I will refrain from dates as I don't want to speculate. We know it will happen and we are preparing to receive them, but dates and numbers will be known shortly.
- ARE THERE STILL SOME AMERICAN TROOPS LEFT?
- Yes. Elements of the new rotation had already arrived-advance groups responsible for reception. They maintain the barracks we built, the vehicle park, and the remaining equipment. They are preparing for the arrival of the new rotation.
- HOW MANY ARE THERE CURRENTLY?
- There is a certain number, I don't want to speculate. The principle is that Lithuania has done its homework, even compensating for their presence. Our resolve to support the Americans is valued. All our negative discussions regarding the US do not help politicians there make the right decisions. We need to trust the American commanders who clearly say we are among their best allies.
- PLANS FOR A TRAINING GROUND IN KAPCIAMIESTIS CAUSED A STIR. HAS THE WAVE OF INDIGNATION SUBSIDED?
- There was a large disinformation campaign and much propaganda. People were misled. The Seimas made the decision, and the talk ended because people realized this is a project of national importance to keep the military effective.
Planning and design are underway, alongside discussions with locals and property owners regarding compensation.
- SO THE EXCAVATORS AREN'T MOVING YET?
- No, not until we buy the land and provide compensation. It could take a year. But the planning has started.
Importantly, if you went to Kapciamiestis now, though we haven't set foot there, timber trucks are running non-stop, clear-cutting forests in large quantities. But for some reason, the people who protested that the military would cut everything down are not protesting now. All summer, timber has been hauled out of that region.
- DO YOU SUSPECT ILLEGAL ACTIVITY?
- No, people likely found out the land would be taken and are simply cashing in. There were massive protests over a few hectares for a shooting range, yet hectares of timber are being taken now without a single protester in sight. This is a paradox. It shows it was a combined effort by hostile forces to prevent the training ground, because a trained military is a threat to them.
- FINALLY, REGARDING UNIVERSAL CONSCRIPTION-HOW FAR ARE WE FROM INCLUDING BOTH MEN AND WOMEN?
- It is a good public discussion. Since my appointment, one of my priorities has been moving through universal conscription toward total defence. We have a plan to grow this toward 2030.
Our wartime structure consists of professional soldiers, conscripts, and reserves. Maintaining a large standing army in peacetime is too expensive and inefficient, so we focus on preparing the reserve. Active reserve soldiers would make up 54 percent of the wartime structure.
It is natural that we want the number of conscripts to increase annually to train as many as possible for the reserve. But there are limits-it's not just about calling someone up; you have to clothe them, give them a rifle, and a place to train.
Our goal by 2030 is to take almost everyone willing and able, as health is also important-aiming for 7,000 to 8,000 through various forms.
- BUT WE ARE STILL TALKING ONLY ABOUT MEN?
- Only men. But women are not restricted. Women can volunteer anytime and they serve very well; they are highly motivated.
Women make up about 13 percent of the personnel, which is roughly the European average. We are not unique in this, but for now, it is based on the principle of volunteering.
- DO YOU SEE MANDATORY CONSCRIPTION FOR WOMEN AS A STRATEGIC GOAL?
- I don't set this goal for myself today because there is no point. We have enough young men meeting the criteria. However, I hear what economists and experts say about demographics. To fill certain specialisations or have more young people, such decisions might have to be made. But is it needed today? Probably not.
- THANK YOU FOR THE CONVERSATION.
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