Latvian special services reveal names of Russian and Belarusian spies

  • 2026-04-02
  • LETA/TBT Staff

RIGA - The Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIDD) has revealed the names of several officers of the General Staff Headquarters (GRU) of the Russian Armed Forces and one GRU officer in Belarus who have deployed the agency's intelligence against Latvia.

The annual threat assessment and the 2025 activity report state that Belarusian and Russian intelligence and security services have a long history of cooperation. In fact, Belarus also carries out intelligence gathering for Russia and its military intelligence can be considered a "branch" of the Russian GRU.

From the Russian special services, MIDD has identified Major Alexey Pizhikov, Captain 2nd Rank Alexey Lesnikov, Captain 2nd Rank Nikolay Chetverikov, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Yushin, Colonel Alexander Gladkov and one Grigory Ivanov. From Belarus, the identified person is Sergei Baranov.

The MIDD has separately highlighted the activities of Russian GRU officer Ivanov, born in 1989, against Latvia since 2017.

Ivanov organized collection of intelligence on private infrastructure used for aviation, such as the Spilve airfield, presence of NATO-allied forces in the country and various developments in Latvia's defense sector. By soliciting support from a distant relative in Latvia, Ivanov obtained information on Latvian public sentiment, assistance to Ukraine and critical infrastructure in the country.

Ivanov also received practical information from the agent, such as the conditions for purchasing prepaid mobile cards in Latvia.

The tasks of Russian GRU-led agents may vary depending on the circumstances, taking into account the needs of the Russian Armed Forces in the target country, including direct support to military tasks, the MIDD explains. The service stresses that a striking example is the activities of a group of agents led by Ivanov himself, who was associated with the GRU 316th Intelligence Centre in Russian-occupied Crimea, in Ukraine until August 2023, when the group was discovered and detained by the Ukrainian security services.

It was established that the agents obtained and passed to Ivanov information for conducting air strikes in Odessa, identified the locations of Ukrainian air defense systems and their movements, and reported on the damage caused by the strikes, according to MIDD.

In the event of a military confrontation between Western countries and Russia, the agency in Latvia recruited by GRU is expected to be used in a similar way as in Ukraine, including by endangering civilian lives, the MIDD report said. The Russian GRU actions in Ukraine reflect methods that could also be used against Latvia, MIDD notes. In some cases, such methods have already been used to obtain intelligence and carry out acts of sabotage in Europe, the service explains.

The MIDD report also states that until February 2022, the Russian Embassy in Latvia was manned by Russian GRU officers who, under the cover of defense/military attache, actually carried out gathering of strategic-level intelligence.

Shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, all GRU officers who were at that time serving as military attaches at the Russian Embassy were expelled from Latvia. However, officers of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service continue to work against Latvia and NATO Member States with at least two officially declared members of the service, MIDD explains.

In the context of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the MIDD has pointed out that the main task of the Russian GRU operational and tactical intelligence is to provide the Russian Armed Forces with the intelligence necessary for planning and implementing military operations abroad.

In Latvia, these activities are focused on the study of NATO force deployments, weapons and combat readiness, mapping of the structure and capabilities of the National Armed Forces, and the identification of vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and defense systems.

An essential prerequisite for the implementation of the Russian GRU operational-tactical intelligence activities is the recruitment of agents (spies) to engage in intelligence gathering, as well as to seek out other individuals who could potentially be involved in cooperation, MIDD notes.

The agency's networking at the operational-tactical level is the responsibility of intelligence centers in Moscow, St.Petersburg, Kaliningrad and Smolensk, whose full-time job is to gather intelligence on the countries not friendly to Russia in the region, including Latvia. The intelligence centers are particularly active in recruiting Latvian nationals who regularly travel to Russia and Belarus, the report says.

The MIDD is a state security institution under the supervision of the Minister of Defense, which carries out military counter-intelligence, intelligence and other tasks stipulated by the Law on State Security Institutions and other regulatory enactments. Since 2002, the Head of the service is Indulis Krekis.