Researching the not far East

Vytis Jurkonis, who studied at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science in Vilnius, is the head of the Political Analysis and Research Division at the Eastern Europe Studies Center (EESC). The spacious building of this think tank is situated on Poskos Street in the quiet and prestigious Vilnius district of Zverynas, where some foreign embassies have their residences. From 2008-2011, Jurkonis published his analytical studies on the current Warsaw-Vilnius relations and the EU-Minsk relations. He often speaks out on Lithuanian TV in favor of democracy for Belarus. After the Russian military aggression against Georgia in 2008, Jurkonis coordinated Lithuania’s humanitarian help action for the Georgians. The EESC, since its establishment in 2006, promotes human rights, democratic values and active civil society in the EU’s Eastern neighborhood. The EESC’s daily work focuses on the improvement of the social and civil environment through people-to-people contacts and better understanding of EU’s Eastern neighbors. The EESC implements development cooperation projects in countries which participate in the EU’s Eastern Partnership program. The EESC also provides analysis and expertise on Eastern Europe.

What will fall first: the regime of Vladimir Putin or the dictatorship of Alexander Lukashenko?

It seems that both strongmen are supported by some one-third of their countries’ population, and that support is weak in big cities, which usually decide on changes. The Russian protests’ leaders already spoke about plans for the coming huge protest demonstration in Moscow in February before the scheduled Russian presidential elections of March 4, and one of the protest movement’s stars, blogger Alexey Navalny, spoke about the possibility of free presidential elections in Russia in September 2012. Putin could help himself by changing his image, but it seems that the moves in his camp are rather opposite to the main trend of the protest movement: on Dec. 22, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev appointed KGB-origin hawk Sergey Ivanov as head of the Kremlin administration, which is one of the key posts in Russia, and, on Dec. 23, Medvedev appointed another anti-Western hawk, Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister, in charge of the defense complex.

As some analysts say, Putin is down, but not out. Definitely there is a window of opportunity for dynamics in Russia, but that very much depends on the civil society. One needs to admit that the demonstrations were somewhat spontaneous and lacked proper planning. The positive sign, though, is that the unity among the opposition is growing, but if it is only the dissatisfaction with the current government that is the uniting element, the unity will eventually collapse. The democrats need to work together and to do some planning if they want to formulate and give the society a vision of tomorrow. You cannot compare things happening in Russia with the events in Belarus. These countries do differ a lot, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.

Putin has much more resources and much more options than Lukashenko. Until now, Putin has lived a relatively easy life, while Lukashenko has been struggling with the opposition for more than a decade. Lukashenko became much more sophisticated by developing a system of control and fear, which is much more manageable with a population of 10, rather than 140, million. It would also be true claiming that Putin has a bigger rivalry, especially when it comes to business circles. There are big oligarchs who are opposing the system in Russia, while Belarusian opposition in this regard could mostly rely only on external resources. All in all, currently I would see the potential in Russia, but there’s a paradox – if anything serious happens in Russia, that would most probably spill over into Belarus because, currently, the regime in Minsk survives only because of the support from Moscow. So, basically, the stability of the regime in Belarus strongly depends on the situation in Russia.

Whom would you prefer to see in the post of Russian president, if choosing from now known Russian public figures?

Focusing on personalities would be basically the same that the current government in Russia was doing by replacing Medvedev with Putin. The main issue is not the person, but the change in rules of the game allowing people to equally participate in a free and fair process electing their candidate.

What do you think about the bloc of Scandinavian and Baltic countries?

The Nordic dimension is currently very much promoted by the key foreign policy makers. Definitely Lithuania has much more in common with the countries from the Baltic Sea region than with the Mediterranean area. It is hardly a surprise that the so-called Snow Meeting [traditional annual winter-time non-formal meetings of top foreign ministry officials and experts from Europe and North America in the Lithuanian town of Trakai] was focusing on this. Small states, like the Baltic countries, should be interested in regional cooperation, though engaging in deeper cooperation with the Nordic countries shouldn’t be an argument confronting the relations with Poland.

What do you think about the policy of Poland towards Lithuania? MEP Vytautas Landsbergis told the magazine IQ that Poland has “a psychological defect from some heritage.”

My opinion is that the relations between Poland and Lithuania became over-politicized. Both sides have run into a situation where none of them can step out and decline their ‘principled position.’ Psychological defects are present both in Poland and in Lithuania and it shows first of all that we are not indifferent to ourselves and to our history. Nonetheless, I feel that some politicians cannot accept the fact that the concept of a nation is changing – we see the process when the voluntary and civic aspect of the identity is starting to prevail over the cultural one. One can resist that, can try to minimize the effects, but you cannot just deny the process. All in all those psychological or mentality issues, which certainly exist, are being manipulated and exaggerated by some politicians. This is the cheapest way to mobilize their electorate.

What are the perspectives of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in integrating with NATO and the EU?  What are the strong and the weak sides of each of these countries regarding such integration? How far and how fast can these countries move in this integration? What are the concrete steps of Lithuania to help these three countries in this integration? What does the EESC do regarding this issue?

If there were some expectations regarding Ukraine and Georgia until the [NATO] Bucharest Summit in 2008, the perspective of integration seems further than it used to be then. The biggest concern for NATO would be the protracted conflicts in Georgia and Moldova. As for the Ukraine, the main issue is its own will to be there. It is no secret that the big neighbor will do everything in its power to prevent the enlargement of NATO into these countries. Moreover, the EU perspective is also rather blurred, but mostly because of the internal EU challenges. There is also an alternative on the table for Ukraine – the project of the Eurasian Union is more an idea than a reality, but this might be an effective tool during the hard times of the EU. Lithuania could hardly change anything alone, but the best thing it could do is to keep the interest of the big states on Eastern Europe by using all the multilateral formats and bilateral cooperation. Parallel to that, though accession to the EU or NATO cannot be promised, it is necessary to advocate the Euro-Atlantic dimension, to enhance the economic cooperation and political engagement with the West. The EESC role in this regard is quite the same in trying to develop people-to-people contacts and enhancing the cooperation between the expert communities in the respective countries.

How will the ruling coalition look after the Lithuanian parliamentary elections in the fall of 2012? I think there will be no change in Lithuanian foreign policy (unless Lithuania’s Polish Electoral Action will be invited as a small appendix to join the ruling coalition, which would silence noises from Warsaw), but maybe you think otherwise?

Whatever the coalition would be, Lithuanian foreign policy needs an agreement between the political parties of Lithuania on the main foreign goals and objectives of Lithuania, as it was done for 2004-2008. One can argue that it was a formal document, but the guidelines are important, otherwise Lithuanian foreign policy would be dispersed among the different foreign policy institutions. Consequently, this would impede any consistent planning and proper implementation. The recent years clearly indicate a threat that the foreign policy of Lithuania could become very personalized, also bureaucratic relying more on procedures and routine rather than on being active and innovative. Despite the future political constellation, I hope that Lithuanian foreign policy would be proactive rather than simply reactive. It should rely on planning, not just on organizing ad hoc events. Ergo, that Lithuanian foreign policy would become more solid.