Lithuania's decision to rescind its objection to the start of EU-Russia talks was, from the outset, a pre-ordained conclusion. There's only so long a country of 3 million can stonewall the will of 500 million, even if truth is on its side. There are times in life when it is better to be accused of compromise, and not intransigence. Regardless, it is a hard pill to swallow given that, in the words of Foreign Minister Petras Vaitiekunas, a final EU-Russia could be signed without a consideration of the Baltic state's interests. If that is so, then one question remains: was Lithuania's behavior worth it?
On the face of it, Lithuania has legitimate grievances against Russia: the unjustifiable decision to cease deliveries of crude oil by pipeline to Mazeikiai; the foot-dragging in the investigations into the disappearance of some 20 Lithuanians, including businessmen, on Russian territory; Moscow's unwillingness to extradite individuals accused of massacring Lithuanian border troops in 1991; and finally, Russia's bullying Georgia and the de facto annexation of Abkhazia.
It's quite a list, so when Lithuanian diplomats in April refused to give the European Commission the green light to launch negotiations with Russia on a new cooperation-partnership agreement, the sense of justification was palpable. And poignant. Lithuanians, after all, had sufficient basis to believe that Brussels, dumbstruck by its addiction to Russian energy, and giddy like a schoolboy to make a first impression on President Dmitry Medvedev, was not listening to its concerns. And that is precisely when a member state should wield its veto power.
Baltic grievances notwithstanding, the negotiations between Brussels and Moscow will be extremely difficult. They will likely take over a year, if they can be accomplished at all. The previous bilateral agreement dates back to 1997, to an era when both the EU and Russia were remarkably different entities; it badly needs to be renewed.
But there are numerous obstacles to surmount 's some so large that it would appear a qualitatively better CPA is nearly hopeless. An EU official in Russia said that much of the new agreement depends upon Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization 's and that, in turn, is unlikely as long as Georgia, a WTO member, can wield its veto. Also, there are numerous trade issues that irritate EU members. Russia last month imposed prohibitive tariffs on timber exports, dealing a blow to paper-producers such as Finland, and last week it banned imports from 18 meat producers in France, Germany, Spain and Belgium. In the long run, the European Commission's energy reform plan runs directly counter to Russia's ambitions in Europe.
Lithuanians, and Poles, who a year ago balked at agreeing to negotiations due to Russia's embargo on Polish beef and vegetable products, must understand that even though they might convince Brussels, they'll never bend Moscow. Kremlin policy makers are only too happy to see the European Union fractured and split in every way possible. The more discord there is in the EU, the easier Moscow can continue signing bilateral deals on pipelines and energy acquisitions with individual member states. It's a tactical approach that has worked wonderfully thus far for Vladimir Putin's foreign policy hacks. So in the long run, Moscow stands to benefit most from protracted negotiations on a new CPA.
