Plans to build a new nuclear power plant reached fruition over the past week after Lithuanian lawmakers adopted legislation mandating the facility's construction. On July 6 the prime ministers of the Baltic states and Poland are expected to meet in Vilnius to announce a final agreement on the plant, which will take approximately 7 - 8 years to erect and will effectively replace the Soviet-built Ignalina reactor slated for closure in 2009.
Lithuania, it would appear, will in the long-term remain a nuclear powerhouse. Nevertheless, as has become customary, Vilnius politicians and bureaucrats played out their usual shenanigans during the course of negotiations. More correctly, the Lithuanians didn't even bother to negotiate when they felt it unnecessary or inexpedient. On more than one occasion Estonian and Latvian officials expressed dismay at Vilnius' odd behavior, which has a tendency to occur when Lithuanian authorities are arranging a large commercial deal. The privatization of Lithuanian Airlines and RST are two common examples of this lack of professionalism.
In short, the Lithuanians want to remain a nuclear energy producer so desperately that they were willing to say anything, promise anything, just so long as the 2.5 billion euro project got off the ground. When the three Baltic states first agreed to build the plant in the beginning of 2006 's the "spirit of Trakai" 's Lithuania was content with a one-third ownership stake. Later, in December, when Poland jumped on board, Vilnius was all-too-prepared to relinquish part of its stake for the sake of its southern neighbor. Cooperation with the Poles proceeded at the expense of Latvia and Estonia.
Finally, on further reflection (probably after curing the New Year's hangover), Lithuanian politicians thought, "Hey, this thing is going to be on our property. Shouldn't that mean we get a few more shares than all the others?" The logic is valid, but the way Prime Minister Gediminas Kirkilas' government went about "arranging" its epiphany was entirely unprofessional: Bilateral deals were cut in a four-way partnership, and partners were not informed of crucial changes.
So be it. We are all Balts, and we must tolerate one another's faults and mistakes. The point is that, given the situation on the energy market, the Baltic region needs an atomic power plant. With 8 million consumers gobbling up more megawatts every year, to refuse nuclear power means to increase dependency on Russia, which is the worst of all options. Russia has irrefutably proven its unreliability as an energy supplier, particularly vis-a-vis the Baltics.
In fact, Baltic states should work together to have the Ignalina plant's operational life extended beyond 2009. In the 5 - 6 year interim between the facility's shutdown and the new plant's launching, Lithuania will have to import an enormous amount of Russian natural gas just to keep the lights on. Dependency on gas will more than double to 75 percent of the country's needs.
Could it be done? In all likelihood, no. But it's worth a try. The situation in the energy industry 's and more importantly, Brussels' understanding of it 's has changed dramatically since Lithuania signed it's EU accession papers back in 2003. There are certainly a few eurocrats in Brussels willing to listen to the arguments. They just want to know that Iganlina's Chernobyl-type reactor will be closed eventually, and that's an assurance that Lithuania, now cut off from Russia's oil supplies, could easily give.
