The sudden decision by Latvia's president to take part in the WWII ceremony in Moscow this May has sparked a flurry of debate both within the Baltics and beyond their borders. The Baltic Times traveled to Tartu to ask Paul Goble, an expert on the Baltic states and a former U.S. State Department analyst, about the significance of the upcoming Victory Day celebrations and the prospect of Baltic-Russian relations.
Why has the choice of whether or not to attend the May 9 celebrations in Moscow been so difficult for Baltic leaders?
The relationship between Moscow and the three Baltic countries has never been easy, and the way President Putin has sought to portray what will happen on May 9 's a celebration of the WWII alliance victory 's ignores what the event meant to Eastern Europe 's namely, the near extinction, or at least the occupation of, the three Baltic states.
As a result, any time there is a media circus in Moscow Estonians, Latvians and Lithu-anians understandably fear that somehow this will be used against them. Thus there exists a desire to prevent Russia from getting the better of them, and one reaction is not to go [to Moscow] at all. The reality, however, of not attending the event is that Moscow could portray the Baltic states as somehow being opposed to the 1945 victory. We've seen in recent months what Russia can do to portray Estonians and Latvians, at least, as taking the wrong side of the conflict.
Clearly nobody in the Baltics wants to give Russia another opportunity to do that, suggesting that representatives should attend. There are important calculations on both sides. Mr. Putin is obviously trying to put the three governments in a difficult position. Whatever choice they make will cause a problem with someone.
The third factor is Mr. Putin's proposal that if Estonia's and Latvia's presidents showed up, he would sign the border agreements, something that the two countries greatly need. On the other hand, this also proposes a problem, as it would appear to recognize the extinction of statehood rather than its continuity.
What, in your opinion, will happen if the Latvian and Estonian presidents both go to Moscow but don't sign the border treaty?
Would it be better if the Russians lived up to their earlier undertakings? Certainly. Is there any prospect of that? No. Is the West going to help Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania force the Russians to change their positions on the borders? No.
And so you must ask: "Do you want this to be a continuing irritant, or do you want to put it behind you?" My thought is that, at the end of the day, you want to put it behind you. That will neither satisfy a lot of people here nor in Latvia, but it removes one issue from the table that Russia has frequently used to soil the Baltics' reputation.
Would Russia be willing to take this issue off the table?
Well, the Russians do not want to look stupid either, meaning that Putin has said, "If you come, we'll sign." I think that the question is where you sign and when you sign. This is something that there's going to be a back-and-forth on. The Russian government has a problem, too. If it appears that this is being set up purely as a propaganda ploy, Russia will lose points. Mr. Putin is clearly holding this meeting because he wants to reaffirm Russia's status as a great power and tie it to the great powers of the world. His reputation has not been very good lately, and relations with the West, except Germany, are shaky.
When will World War II matters stop being important in relations with Russia?
In three or four generations. People here worry about history a lot more because there's been so many monumental events. The occupation, conquest and brutal mistreatment of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians will make up the countries' identity for a long time to come. Will it define what governments are going to do? Not always, and probably less and less with time. But it will continue to be something that governments must both reflect on and cope with.
President Vaira Vike-Freiberga said in her statement that the Baltic countries are not Siamese triplets, and that Latvia should be represented where most European countries are.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are increasingly dissimilar. We're beyond the period of the late '80s and early '90s when the three Baltic countries always cooperated, when joint statements from leaders were the norm. Each country has its own agenda. That's not to say that they can't cooperate, but why must there be only one Baltic position? I think President Vike-Freiberga's statement about how she sees this event and her attempt to redefine May 9 is a model of its kind and brilliantly executed.
So essentially you agree to what Toomas Hendrik Ilves once said about Estonia's inevitable distancing from Latvia and Lithuania?
Ilves' statement suggests that it was an Estonian decision to be different. I don't think that's what it's about. Yes, some countries insist on seeing the three as the same, as somehow inevitably linked, but culturally, politically, historically, linguistically, economically and in terms of social relations with minority groups, these are very different places. If you look back over the last 15 years what you see is a growing diversity of opinion, which has been largely ignored. Some of the big events, such as troop withdrawal, recovery of independence, dealing with minorities, and EU/NATO accession, were treated as bloc issues.
Do you find it more convenient for large countries to consider the Baltics as one?
I don't want to use the word convenient 's I think that's wrong, but it's what some people in this part of the world think. Most people did not focus very much on the Baltic countries before 1920 because they were part of an empire. When they became independent after 1917 and 1918 they were treated differently by Western powers. When they were occupied by the Soviets at almost exactly the same time and when the overriding single issue was the same in all three states then, yes, the big Western countries and the Soviets treated them as a single unit. But if you look at issues like staffing patterns in embassies and the representation of governmental agencies, there's increasing diversity in terms of how such topics are seen, and I think we're going to see even more.
What do you think of the idea to demand compensation from Russia for the damage caused by the occupation?
I think that's a nonstarter. While morally it is absolutely right, practically it is not going to happen. It's becoming less and less likely that any Russian government, even one with [former Foreign Minister] Andrey Kozyrev in it again, would be willing to even admit that what they did here was wrong.
