How we strengthen the defence of European democracy

At a time when Russia and other malicious actors seek to illegitimately influence democratic processes in Europe, both the EU and its Member States must find more effective ways to counter these attempts.

In recent years, we have seen countless examples of Russia trying to influence European elections by systematically spreading disinformation or through other actions designed to undermine public trust in democratic institutions. Most recently, Russia’s efforts to influence the Czech parliamentary elections through troll farms and foreign operations were documented. Earlier this year, during the German elections, the so-called “doppelgänger” phenomenon – named after the German word for look-alike – gained attention when Russian interests created replicas of well-known news sites to spread false, pro-Russian, narratives.

Another widely discussed example of Russian interference was last year’s Romanian presidential election, which had to be reorganised after reports of Russian influence operations. Intelligence reports revealed systematic use of fake Russian social media accounts to sway the debate, while the country’s election authority was targeted by large-scale cyberattacks. TikTok reported deleting 175,000 fake or spam accounts in the aftermath of the elections.

Latvia and the Baltic states have also long been familiar with Russian disinformation and propaganda operations. It has recently been revealed once again that Russian special services are using Latvian residents who have been recruited on the social media platform Telegram, as well as during visits to Russia, to spread the Russian narrative.

This reality underscores the need for the EU to take a comprehensive approach to better protect our democratic systems from foreign interference. Although delayed, the European Commission on November 12 presented the proposal of the European Democracy Shield, outlining concrete EU measures to safeguard Europe’s democracies from external threats.

The message of the EPP Group is clear: the time for piecemeal or complacent solutions is over. We expect an ambitious and courageous reform agenda to defend democracy.

To strengthen our democratic resilience, the EU should now act in the following key areas:

1. Strengthen our capacity to act.

Current efforts to identify and respond to foreign interference and disinformation must be reinforced and taken to the next level. The goal should be to detect and counter influence operations as they unfold, rather than merely analysing them afterward. Countermeasures, such as EU sanctions mechanisms, must be better integrated into this work. The Commission’s pledge to create a European Centre for Democratic Resilience is important, but it must become more than a symbolic office in the Berlaymont building. The new structure should act as a centre of excellence, be independent, and have sustainable funding.

2. Strengthen our electoral systems and infrastructure.

Every EU Member State has its own democratic traditions and election procedures. Yet, there are shared structures and minimum standards. Within the framework of the European Democracy Shield, the classification of electoral systems as part of the EU’s critical infrastructure along with the strengthening of the European Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE) should be urgently implemented.

3. Establish clear digital rules of engagement.

Freedom of expression, including online, is fundamental. However, even the digital sphere requires rules. The Digital Services Act (DSA) establishes obligations for major social media platforms, such as ensuring users’ rights to appeal account suspensions. At the same time, platforms must take measures to minimise the misuse of their systems – such as the systematic spread of disinformation during elections. They must become more proactive in prevention, and the DSA must be fully implemented. Another issue that needs to be addressed is the practice of covertly purchasing political support from influencers. 

4. Support independent media and civil society.

Building societies that are resilient against influence operations is crucial. In countries like Hungary, the space for independent media and civil society has become increasingly restricted. Strengthening the EU’s democratic defences must therefore also involve protecting media freedom, empowering civil society, and promoting media literacy among citizens to ensure they can critically assess information and resist disinformation campaigns.

5. Enhance the EU’s capacity to respond to hybrid threats.

Attempts to destabilise societies or erode public trust can take many forms – from the instrumentalisation of migrants to pressure the EU’s external borders, which we have also witnessed in the Baltic States, to the sabotage of energy infrastructure. The EU must better equip its agencies to assist Member States in protecting themselves against such hybrid attacks. This includes clarifying and strengthening the mandates of Europol, Frontex, and Eurojust.

6. New and improved ways to support neighbourhood countries.

Countries in the EU’s neighbourhood are even more exposed to foreign influence attempts than EU Member States themselves, not least from Russia. The example of Moldova is particularly telling. Reforms to systematically increase EU support for these countries’ countermeasures should be a cornerstone of the European Democracy Shield.

In an increasingly uncertain global environment, we must safeguard European cooperation, our democracy, and our shared values. We both hope and expect that the Commission will now present an ambitious agenda to make this possible in practice.