13 member states, including Latvia, call for EU response to GNSS interference

VILNIUS - 13 EU member states, including Latvia, have called on the European Commission to respond to interference with Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) in EU countries.

The ministers for transport and digital affairs from 13 countries have sent a joint letter to the European Commission, urging immediate and coordinated action in response to interference with Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) originating from Russia and Belarus. Following Lithuania’s initiative, the letter also highlights the urgent need to accelerate the deployment of interference-resistant GNSS services, enhance the overall resilience of critical infrastructure, and strengthen safety and security across Europe.

"The current security environment demands a unified response to hybrid threats posed by hostile regimes, as well as close cooperation to strengthen Europe’s preparedness and resilience. Disruptions to GNSS signals have a direct impact on strategic sectors such as transport, energy, and telecommunications. To prevent potential incidents, we must act swiftly and decisively at the European Union level - not individually, but in a coordinated manner," Lithuanian Transport and Communications Minister Eugenijus Sabutis says.

In the letter addressed to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas; Commissioner for Defense and Space, Andrius Kubilius; Commissioner for Sustainable Transport and Tourism, Apostolos Tzitzikostas and other members of the European Commission, the ministers emphasize that since 2022, two types of interference to GNSS - jamming and spoofing - have been observed in the airspace of the Baltic Sea Region, posing a threat to various modes of transport, particularly civil aviation and maritime navigation.

The joint letter signed by the ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Germany, Slovakia, Finland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, and Romania, also states that that GNSS interference cases are not random incidents but a systematic, deliberate action by Russia and Belarus, which can be used as a hybrid attack on strategic radio spectrum, essential for modern technology, regional safety, and security, particularly in transport.

Furthermore, the ministers call on the EU to increase diplomatic efforts to address the interference and apply pressure on the responsible parties, including legal action against responsible individuals and entities involved in the deliberate interference with GNSS signals, to enhance European safety and security.

Among other immediate actions, the ministers propose to intensify radio frequency monitoring and enhance civil-military coordination mechanisms among Member States for shared monitoring, data exchange, and possible response to GNSS interference. They also advocate for accelerating the deployment of interference-resistant GNSS services, particularly the anti-spoofing features of the Galileo program, and for upgrading and modernizing conventional navigation infrastructure.

In late February, Lithuanian presidential national security advisor Marius Cesnulevicius said that GPS interference had to do with Russia's step taken to defend itself from Ukraine's retaliatory strikes on Russian territory, adding that Lithuania was not a specific target.

Data from Lithuania's flight management company Oro Navigacija (Air Navigation) show that there were 440 reports on GPS interference in January, a tenfold increase from January 2024.