Behind the Ukraine rhetoric

Ukraine and the European Union held a summit in Copenhagen last month. Five days later, NATO Secretary General George Robertson visited Kiev on the fifth anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine charter. The outcome of both events reflects the skepticism with which Ukraine's strategic foreign policy goal of "returning to Europe" through integration into trans-Atlantic and European structures is still met in Brussels.

In his annual address to Parliament in May, President Leonid Kuchma outlined a timetable for creating a free-trade area with the European Union by 2004, a customs union in 2005-07, signing an associate agreement in 2007 and fulfilling all EU membership criteria by 2011.

On the eve of the Copenhagen summit, the Ukrainian Parliament issued an appeal approved by 257 out of 450 deputies asking the summit to upgrade the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or PCA, which was ratified and put into effect only in 1998, "to a qualitatively new level of development" that would lead to EU membership.

But the joint EU-Ukraine summit statement reaffirmed that only the PCA would be the basis "for developing our relations further." The EU also refused at the Copenhagen summit to grant Ukraine the status of a "market economy."

Why has Ukraine again failed to convince Europe of its right to join the EU? Denmark, which took over the rotating EU presidency in July, is the only union member to have closed down its Ukrainian embassy, itself a reflection of its lack of interest in that country. For the EU, it is highly convenient that Ukraine's domestic policies simply reinforce the deeply held view in Brussels that Ukraine is not part of Europe.

Bertel Haarder, Denmark's minister for refugees, immigration and integration, laughed off Kuchma's plan to gradually move into the folds of the EU by 2011 as reminiscent of Soviet-era announ-cements that communism was on the verge of being achieved.

"Instead of statements and expectations for clear signals, the Ukrainian authorities should switch to fulfilling arrangements and fulfilling their declarations," Haarder advised.

A major obstacle to "returning to Europe" is the deeply ingrained Soviet political culture that eastern Ukrainian leaders, such as Kuchma and his oligarchic allies, seem incapable of ditching.

Only nine days after the Copenhagen summit, Our Ukraine party member and anti-Kuchma campaigner Oleksandr Zhyr was removed, through a flagrant misuse of the legal system, from contesting repeat elections in Dnipropetrovsk that he was set to win. His removal ensured a victory for the pro-Kuchma, For a United Ukraine candidate.

Robertson's visit was more productive because NATO, unlike the EU, has an open-door policy on membership. Whereas the EU rules out moving from a PCA to an association agreement, NATO is willing to upgrade Ukraine from a charter to a membership action plan, or MAP, which must be fulfilled for membership.

For the moment, NATO still doubts Kiev's willingness to adopt the necessary nonmilitary reforms that make up four out of five MAP sections. Robertson warned that Kiev would have to display "a sustained commitment to the implementation of political, economic and defense reforms," and uphold human rights, the rule of law and freedom of the media.

NATO also remains concerned that Soviet-era ties between C.I.S. intelligence services could compromise shared intelligence between Ukraine and NATO. Ukraine's annual expenditure of $590 million on the military is abysmal and would require a six- to sevenfold increase.

NATO is also tempering its enthusiasm so as not to damage its new strategic relationship with Russia.

The May 23 decision by Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council to seek NATO membership was transformed into a presidential decree during Robertson's visit. Nevertheless, NATO, like the EU, believes Kuchma issues declarations that go unfulfilled. A July poll by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies found that the same proportion – 32 percent – supported and opposed NATO membership, with 22 percent undecided.

The EU continues to rule out Ukraine's membership and would be forced to change this position only if someone it trusts to implement Ukraine's "Europeani-zation," such as ex-Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, were elected president in 2004.

Robertson also believes Uk-raine's membership remains "hypothetical" and "long-term," and that "membership is not on the agenda right now." Nevertheless, at least NATO has not ruled Ukraine out, unlike the EU.

Taras Kuzio is a resident fellow at the University of Toronto's Center for Russian and East European Studies.