WARSAW — Last week, Russia-watchers worldwide gave a collective sigh of relief when Greece did not block additional sanctions on Russia, thus indicating a unified stance from the European Union. Meanwhile, in the tranquility of Warsaw’s tree-lined presidential district, solutions were offered by a symposium of an elite group known as the Transatlantic Renewal Initiative. No Kremlin trolls hijacking the comments here. Nor were there any Russian government-led disruptions citing trumped-up fire code violations.
The U.S. based World Affairs Institute and the European Academy of Diplomacy sponsored the two-day conference. In attendance were European, American, and Russian government officials, political analysts, and journalists, all of whom touched upon subjects that would have provoked ire, if they were discussed inside Russia. The former President of Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis, gave the keynote address. Former Polish Minister of Defense Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Russian opposition politician Vladimir Kara-Murza, and scholars Jeffrey Gedmin, James Denton, and Peter Pomerantsev all joined in a roundtable discussion. A further examination of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine concluded the obvious: that the combined use of soft and hard power mechanisms define a new type of “hybrid war” of physical and non-kinetic manifestation.
The domestic aim of the Kremlin’s activities was described as “to enhance the legitimacy of the existing model of governance,” as most Russians are distracted by populist fear-mongering and kept in a state of complacency by the state-run media. For example, the government has slashed the minimum price of vodka by 16%, extended legal alcohol sales hours, kept gasoline prices low, and vilified both prominent and obscure so-called enemies of the state.
According to the roundtable, one of Russia’s international aims is to justify its aspirations of creating a zone of economic, military, and political superiority, which includes sovereign states near its western borders. The Russian narrative machine deftly employs tactics such as psychological warfare and the use of propaganda to crowd the information space, confusing and disorganising its target audience: both European and American political conservatives. But how did we get here?
After the emergence of the Russian Federation in the 1990s, the West offered Russia partial inclusion in its political and economic space. This led to two decades of active and successful trade relations between Russia and the West. Eventually, Russia joined the WTO, and the G7 became the G8. The West grew accustomed to Russia’s new place in the world and was caught off-guard in 2008 by Russia’s involvement in Georgia; in 2014, in Ukraine; and now, in 2015, between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
However, despite any measures of inclusion offered to the West’s former geopolitical foe, Russia was not fully integrated into key Western institutions and was left “at the door.” Perhaps limited consideration of Russia’s possible place in the world and its influence in it, led Russia to chart its own destiny – unhindered, but not without precedent. The Kremlin began testing the possibilities of creating discord in the EU and testing the reactions of the West to its activities against neighboring states. Now, said a former EU official, Russia’s “small ruling elite has lost the trust of the international community profoundly.”
Modern wars, set against the idea of permanent global conflict, are increasingly being fought as “contact-less wars of perception,” explained a prominent Russia scholar. In the manner of the most recent Gaza war, the outcome on the ground is less significant than the resulting narrative in global public opinion. For example, as the Kremlin wages its hybrid wars, in the West, Russia denies military involvement inany of the conflicts on its borders and within the borders of neighboring states. This “multi-level bullying,” was specifically referenced by a renowned defense analyst in the room as she recounted 2014’s increase in Russian aerial and naval incursions and near-incursions into northern European nations’ territory. All in all, Russia’s hybrid approach has succeeded in threatening both transatlantic unity and geopolitical security.
It was emphasised that these activities also extend to Russia’s domestic civic space, where Stasi-inspired tactics have sowed fear and pervasive anxiety in Russian civil society. Anyone who has fretted that Mr. Putin’s successor could be worse for Russia may become a victim of such action. Most notably, a Russian housewife and mother of seven was accused of treason for allegedly calling the Ukrainian Embassy to theorise upon the absence of some Russian soldiers in her region, Smolensk.
Also made clear at the conference was a consensus that Mr. Putin is ready to exploit Europe’s current economic problems for his own gain. It was said that Mr. Putin feels that Europeans would be willing to sacrifice some of their principles for their economic aspirations, as was emphasised by Federica Mogherini’s “business as usual” comments of January 14th, 2015.
Despite the deterioration in economic relations, the West and Russia remain engaged in ‘business as usual’ on broader issues such as terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation. Nevertheless, there remains a need for “all major media to broadcast in Russian,” and for a united West to engage with Russian society, whether or not a fully democratic government is in power.
Recommendations were made for the promotion of “people-to-people contacts,” in the form of support of international scholarship through youth education and athletic programs such as Erasmus+. Publisher Gene Zolotarev honed in on the importance of EU policy targeting “the subset of the Russian people who have a disproportionate influence on the internal agenda.” In short, will engagement with Russia come at the cost of European values or even of the shared interests of Central Europe or Ukraine? Can Russia be effectively reintegrated into the family of nations? Or unlike China or India, can Russia only survive by being part of the West, concluded various symposium speakers.
Otherwise “there is no haven for Russia.” By the end of the final day’s sessions, the Transatlantic Renewal Initiative had agreed upon Europe and America’s responsibility to create a unified and realistic agenda towards Russia and Mr. Putin. Perhaps a lofty goal, given that Russian’s recent aggression toward its neighbours might just be the beginning of a broader campaign.
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