Russian opposition figure Kara-Murza says in Vilnius Putin rule nearing end - BNS INTERVIEW

VILNIUS - Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin appears as a “weak, paranoid old man” whose rule is nearing its end, Russian opposition figure Vladimir Kara-Murza said in an interview.

“Putin likes to project an image of a strongman, but he looks like a weak, insecure, paranoid old man who constantly sits in his bunker,” said the Kremlin critic during his visit to Vilnius.

“Every dictatorship has an expiration date, and it looks very much like the expiration date of Putin’s dictatorship is approaching,” he said.

Kara-Murza was released in 2024 during a prisoner exchange between Russia and the West.

Commenting on Putin’s claims that the war in Ukraine is subsiding, the opposition figure said no end should be expected as long as Putin remains in power.

He also said it was only a matter of time before significant political changes occur in Russia, making it vital to prepare for that moment.

The 44-year-old British-Russian citizen was sentenced to 25 years in a penal colony in 2023 on charges of treason. He was held in Omsk, Siberia.

Kara-Murza said he suffers from a nerve condition that developed following what he said were poisoning attempts by the Russian Federal Security Service in 2015 and 2017.

OTHER INTERVIEW TOPICS:

* Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's mediation between Russia and Europe regarding the war in Ukraine would be "Putin talking to Putin".

* It is only acceptable for Europe to speak with the Kremlin on humanitarian issues.

* US President Donald Trump is playing on Putin's team.

* Internal infighting within the Russian opposition.

– I WANTED TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT THE MAY 9TH PARADE IN MOSCOW. IT WAS NOTICEABLY SMALLER AND MORE RESTRAINED THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. WHAT DO YOU THINK THAT MEANS, AND WHAT DOES IT SUGGEST ABOUT THE CURRENT STATE OF RUSSIA’S CAPABILITIES?

– Let’s start with the fact that Victory Day on the 9th of May has long been hijacked by the Putin regime for its propaganda purposes. On the official level–for millions of people across Russia it is still about commemorating the victory against the Nazis–but for the Putin regime, it is a showcase of their supposed power and superiority. (...). They tried to put on a big propaganda show to demonstrate their supposed power and sense of security, but it turned out to be exactly the opposite. I think the best illustration was the decree by (Ukrainian – BNS) President (Volodymyr – BNS) Zelensky, who gave permission to hold the parade because Mr. Trump had asked him to do so.

Putin likes to project an image of strength, but he looks like a weak, insecure, paranoid old man who constantly sits in his bunker, surrounded by air defense systems, blocking access to the internet (...). This is what happens when you stay in power for 26 years without any democratic processes, without elections, without independent media, and without any feedback from society.

II think this clash between the image created by Kremlin propaganda and the real situation of the regime is very telling. The image they project is that they are strong and secure, and that everyone in Russia supports Putin and the war in Ukraine. But actions always speak louder than words, and the actions of the Putin regime tell a completely different story than the one their propaganda tries to make us believe. Look at the horrendous repression in Russia today. On average, five people are targeted with various forms of political repression every day. (...). If everyone really loved Putin so much and supported the war, what would be the point of keeping society in a state of constant fear? This has long been their strategy for staying in power.

Every dictatorship has an expiration date, and it appears very likely that Putin’s dictatorship is approaching its own. We see this in many ways. (...) Regardless of how problematic opinion polls are in an authoritarian state where people cannot freely speak their minds, if you look at the latest Levada Center polls, you will see that 67 percent of Russians advocate for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and peace talks instead of continuing the war. That is two-thirds in the context of a dictatorship; imagine what people would say if they were free to speak their minds.

I worked for many years with Boris Nemtsov (the Russian opposition politician assassinated in 2015 – BNS) (...). He always said that in a country with no normal ways to measure public opinion, no free elections, no independent media, and no reliable polls, the best way to judge the true situation is to look at what the regime is doing. And from everything this regime does, we see intense fear and paranoia. In response to your question–I think that so-called Victory Day parade on the 9th of May was a very vivid illustration of that.

– YOU MENTIONED THAT THE REGIME IS SCARED. AFTER THE PARADE, PUTIN CLAIMED THAT THE WAR RUSSIA STARTED IN UKRAINE IS COMING TO AN END; DOES THIS INDICATE FEAR? HOW WOULD YOU INTERPRET THIS MESSAGE YOURSELF?

– I am convinced that as long as Vladimir Putin stays in power, this war will not end. He has been in power for 26 years, and all this time, this man has been killing. (...).

When it comes to Russia, history shows a very clear lesson: repression in Russia always turns into external aggression. Always. Because a government that does not respect the rights and freedoms of its own people will not respect the borders of other countries. We saw what happened in Georgia, in Ukraine for the first time with the annexation of Crimea, in Syria, and, of course, in Ukraine for the second time in February 2022.

As long as Putin is in power, this war will not stop. The only way to achieve lasting peace and security–not just for Ukraine but for all of Europe–is a democratic Russia. Only when Russia itself becomes a normal, civilized, democratic European state will true peace and security prevail in Europe.

The fact that he is forced to say the war is "coming to an end" shows the effectiveness of the pressure. All types of pressure–political, diplomatic, and economic–the sanctions are working. We see this even from official statements. The Russian economy is not doing very well, to put it mildly. But most importantly, we are seeing very clear signs of public discontent in the country. Even people who are neutral or even support the regime–bloggers, influencers, and so on–are starting to speak out against what is happening, because it affects even those who "fashionably" try to stay out of politics.

In authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, even if you try to stay out of politics, politics still reaches you. Regarding people's daily lives, the internet blocking, for example, affects everyone. Even if you try to be apolitical, it still affects you: you can't use your phone, you can't call a taxi, you can't do anything. Of course, the regime feels it. The regime is afraid, the regime is paranoid, and the intensified repression against anyone–especially those speaking out against the war–is a very clear sign of that. I think another vivid illustration was the recent statement by opposition politician Boris Nadezhdin (...), that in all 26 years of Putin's rule, he has never seen or felt such discontent with the regime.

– REGARDING THE PUBLIC DISCONTENT AND INTERNET RESTRICTIONS YOU MENTIONED–SOME ANALYSTS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE BLOCKING HAD A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THIS DISSATISFACTION. WOULD YOU AGREE?

– If we look at the past, we can see that there have been periods of high public discontent before. Probably the most vivid moment was the winter of 2011–2012 and the massive protests in Moscow and across Russia. (...). This was likely the period when the Putin regime was at its weakest. It was specifically after those protests were suppressed that the regime began its rapid crackdown. (...) Since 2011–2012, Putin has understood perfectly well that his regime is not based on legitimacy or support. The only way they can rule is through fear.

Since then, we have seen several moments that sparked great public dissatisfaction, and one of them was the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. (...). The Kremlin is well aware of the significant public opposition to the Putin regime. And returning to your question–this is now reaching even those people who try to stay away from politics; however, in a dictatorship, even if you try to stay away from politics, politics eventually reaches you. Internet access restrictions–everyone understands these are a direct consequence of the war and the dictatorship. They didn't come out of nowhere. So, it doesn't surprise me that in recent weeks we are seeing even people who were neutral or even supported the regime speaking out against it more and more often.

I believe this is a process the regime will no longer be able to stop or roll back. It is only a matter of time before significant political changes occur in Russia, and it is very important to be prepared for that moment. Because one thing we know from Russian history is that major political changes in the country usually happen suddenly, unexpectedly, and completely out of the blue. The next time significant political changes take place in Russia, it will be exactly the same. None of us will know even a few days before. It could happen in two years or in three weeks. But it won't take too long, at least for biological reasons–Putin is already over 70 years old, he has significantly exceeded the average male life expectancy in Russia, and regardless of what he and (Chinese President – BNS) Xi Jinping might like to think, they are not going to live to be 150. Change is coming, that window of opportunity will open, and we must all be ready to use that window properly.

– YOUR COMMENTS RAISE THE QUESTION OF A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY. DO YOU SEE IT APPROACHING, AND HOW SHOULD THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION, INCLUDING YOURSELF, PREPARE FOR AND APPROACH IT? ADDITIONALLY, YOU MENTIONED THE REGIME’S EXPIRATION DATE–IS THERE A POSSIBILITY THAT SERGEI SHOIGU, THE SECRETARY OF THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD SIMPLY TAKE PUTIN'S PLACE, ALLOWING THE REGIME TO PERSIST WITH ONLY MINOR TWEAKS?

– I will start with the second question and answer as a historian, not a politician. (...). The model we have seen in Russia for over 250 years is that whoever comes to power turns the policy 180 degrees–not just because of the need to blame those previously in power, but also because they need to start with a clean slate. It is also because personalistic dictatorships never survive without the person at the top. Putin's regime is not ideological; it is a personalistic dictatorship. As soon as that individual at the top of the "vertical of power" is gone, the whole system will collapse like a house of cards.

This brings me to the first part of your question: how can we be ready? When I say that a window of opportunity for democratic change will open in Russia after Putin, I am not saying that Russia will become a perfect democracy next week. I am saying there will be a chance, an opportunity to build a lasting democracy. We must ensure this chance is seized, not only for the sake of the country but for all of Europe–because, as I mentioned, a repressive and dictatorial Russia will always remain a threat. A regime that does not respect the rights of its own people will not respect the borders of its neighbors or the norms of international law.

For such a chance to be used successfully, we must learn from the two main mistakes made in the 1990s, the last time Russia had a chance for a democratic transformation. The first mistake was domestic. We know that a necessary condition for a successful transition from dictatorship to democracy is what lawyers call "transitional justice." This essentially means transparency and accountability, where all information about the crimes of previous regimes is publicly disclosed. (...). Evil that is not publicly reflected upon, evaluated, and condemned will return. Once the Putin regime collapses, it must answer for all its crimes committed both against the people in Russia and against the citizens of other nations: in Georgia, Syria, and, of course, Ukraine. We need this accountability just as much as the Ukrainians do. Russia will not have a normal democratic future until every one of these criminals is held to account.

The second mistake was that the Western world was not ready, or perhaps not willing, to fully accept a nascent democratic Russia as one of its own and integrate it into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. An example I often use: in December 1991, Boris Yeltsin (former Russian President – BNS) officially wrote to then-NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, raising the question of future Russian membership in NATO. That letter never even received a response. Western leaders simply were not ready because, once the Soviet regime collapsed, no one knew what to do. The West's lack of readiness to help and integrate Russia on its path toward a democratic system played a negative role. This mistake cannot be repeated. As long as Russia remains a dictatorship, it will always remain a threat, and the only way to ensure long-term peace in Europe is to have a democratic Russia.

So, those are the two lessons: real accountability for the crimes of the Putin regime once it falls, and the readiness of the free world to help post-Putin democratic Russia on its path to transition–so that in 30 or 40 years, our grandchildren do not have to face another "small Putin" and new wars beginning all across Europe.

– REGARDING THE WEST, VOICES HAVE RECENTLY BEEN HEARD IN EUROPE CALLING FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE KREMLIN; DO YOU SEE A POINT IN THIS, OR DO YOU BELIEVE RUSSIA SHOULD BE COMPLETELY ISOLATED?

– I think it is absolutely unacceptable to appease the Putin regime. If there is one clear lesson from the history of the 20th century, it is that appeasing an aggressor never leads to peace. Dictatorships understand the free world’s appeasement as a sign of weakness. We saw this at the beginning of the 21st century, when many Western leaders–George W. Bush and Barack Obama (former US presidents – BNS), Tony Blair (former UK Prime Minister – BNS), and Gerhard Schröder (former German Chancellor – BNS)–tried to engage with Putin in a deferential manner, which contributed to the consolidation of his dictatorship. There must be no appeasement of the Putin regime. The only language the Putin dictatorship understands is the language of force and principles.

However, there is one exception–it is not an exception I invented–(...) contacts for humanitarian purposes. Specifically, I am referring to Russian political prisoners and Ukrainian captives held in Russian jails. (...). I believe this is the only area–the humanitarian one–where it is acceptable and even necessary for the free world to speak with the Putin regime. Of course, in saying this, I must acknowledge my personal bias, because if it weren't for a prisoner exchange, I would likely be dead right now instead of sitting here in Vilnius. I understand the moral dilemmas regarding such negotiations with dictatorships, but I also firmly believe that nothing is more valuable or important than human life. (...). So on this issue, and only on this issue–yes, I believe it is important to talk even to the Putin regime, while fully recognizing that it is an illegitimate dictatorship to which appeasement is unacceptable.

– YOU MENTIONED G. SCHRÖDER; V. PUTIN NAMED HIM AS ONE OF THE POSSIBLE NEGOTIATORS FROM THE EUROPEAN SIDE (THE INTERVIEWEE LAUGHS – BNS)... YOU’RE LAUGHING, SO I GUESS YOU DON'T TAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL SERIOUSLY?

– II’m laughing because, in that case, Putin would be talking to Putin. The late U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos once referred to Gerhard Schröder as a "political prostitute," and I don’t think there is a better way to describe him. We can criticize many Western leaders for their failed policy of appeasement toward Putin. Tony Blair was the first Western leader to bring Putin onto the international stage in the early 2000s; George W. Bush looked into Putin's eyes and saw his soul; Barack Obama engaged in a so-called "reset" policy. All these policies deserve criticism because they were counterproductive, wrong, and, in my opinion, immoral. But I do not think you will find a more egregious example than Gerhard Schröder, who literally sold himself to Vladimir Putin. That is why I couldn't help laughing when I heard his name; if Schröder were the EU’s representative in talks with Putin, it would be Putin talking to Putin. He would essentially have two delegates talking to each other, and for obvious reasons, I do not think that is acceptable.

– EARLIER YOU MENTIONED SEVERAL FORMER US  PRESIDENTS. HOW DO YOU ASSESS WASHINGTON'S CURRENT ROLE REGARDING RUSSIA'S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE?

– There is no doubt that the current US administration is not an honest broker; it is playing on Vladimir Putin's team. We have seen this from numerous statements made over the nearly year and a half they have been in power. They have been deferential and complimentary toward Putin, while all the criticism is reserved for Ukraine, for Volodymyr Zelensky, and the Ukrainian leaders, who are the victims of aggression, not the aggressors. You remember the so-called "Trump peace plan" presented last November. It was not a peace plan; it was Vladimir Putin’s Christmas wish list (...).

It is perfectly clear to me that the current US administration is playing on Putin's team on this issue, which is why there is an urgent need for principled European leadership in any potential ceasefire negotiations. We hear the administration of President Donald Trump talking about sanctions, frozen assets, territories, investment opportunities, and minerals. Nobody is talking about people. Therefore, we need principled voices in Europe.

– KYRYLO BUDANOV, THE HEAD OF THE UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND FORMER MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF WHO RECENTLY VISITED LITHUANIA, SAID THAT IF RUSSIA WERE TRULY READY FOR A SERIOUS DISCUSSION, THEN UKRAINE WOULD ALSO BE READY. HOW DO YOU SEE A POSSIBLE UKRAINIAN CONVERSATION WITH RUSSIA?

– As a Russian politician and citizen, I would not presume to give any advice to Ukrainians. We have no right to do so. Only Ukraine itself can decide how to proceed. I can only say that I know that after the fall of the Putin regime, it will take a long time to restore normal neighborly relations with Ukraine. This will be one of the most difficult tasks, but as a historian, I know that it is possible. (...). However, that reconciliation between a post-Putin democratic Russia and Ukraine will necessarily have to go through atonement, repentance, and accountability from the Russian side. It also goes without saying that any democratic Russia will have to return to the legitimate, internationally recognized borders of 1991. For me, that is a non-negotiable point. At the moment, I can say that we maintain regular contacts with our Ukrainian colleagues. These are not public, as they are not done for PR purposes, but rather to lay the groundwork for the future reconciliation process.

– LET’S MOVE TO THE FINAL PART. I WANTED TO ASK ABOUT THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION. RECENTLY, ACCUSATIONS APPEARED IN THE PUBLIC SPACE FROM THE FORMER HEAD OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION FOUNDATION AGAINST THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP; WITHOUT GETTING INTO THE STORY ITSELF–THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT INTERNAL CONFLICTS HAVE OCCURRED. HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE CURRENT STATE OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION?

– The word "opposition" is perhaps no longer appropriate in our context. To me, opposition is a term from democratic societies, as members of the opposition should sit in parliaments, debate in television studios, and run in elections. In our country, people who oppose the Putin regime are either dead, in prison, or in exile, so terms like "dissidents" or "members of the resistance" would be more fitting.

Regarding the essence of your question–I have always believed that internal disputes between various anti-Kremlin forces are wrong, harmful, counterproductive, and often simply ridiculous. As a matter of principle, I have never participated in or even commented on these internal bickerings because my enemy sits in the Kremlin; Vladimir Putin is our common enemy. I believe we must be able to find a common language with our fellow oppositionists to focus on what matters now. Regardless of the differences we may have among ourselves, it is not normal to prioritize these internal disputes over the common struggle against the dictatorship. We will be able to discuss any disagreements in a future, democratically elected Russian parliament. But first, we must reach that point, those elections, and that parliament. At this moment, we must stand shoulder to shoulder in the fight against this regime.

– THANK YOU FOR THE CONVERSATION.