Old lines and new ones

  • 2001-09-06
  • Paul Goble
Seven years ago, on Aug. 30, Moscow formally ended its nearly half-century military presence in the former East Germany and in two Baltic countries, a Russian withdrawal that changed the geopolitical map of Europe in ways that many in Russia continue to find difficult to accept.

On Aug. 30, 1994, Moscow formally renounced its post-World War II occupation rights in what had been the German Democratic Republic, and simultaneously pulled out of Estonia and Latvia the Russian forces that had been there since the re-establishment of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states in 1944-45.

The Russian withdrawal from German soil was the subject of high-level talks between Russia and the Soviet Union's former wartime allies, which also once enjoyed occupation rights, while the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia and Latvia was largely the result of negotiations between Moscow and the governments of these two countries.

Many at the time viewed both these decisions as representing the final end of the lines that had divided Europe during the Cold War. And some optimistically asserted that with this Russian withdrawal, the era of a Europe divided by any lines was or at least should be permanently over.

Almost all the countries of Eastern Europe have sought to join the European Union and NATO. They view membership in these organizations as a guarantee that they will remain on the other side of the line to where they stood in the past.

While some had expected that Russian attitudes on this point would soften, two reports in the Russian press this week suggest that the reverse may in fact be happening and that Moscow may be becoming even more concerned about new lines in Europe, even as Russian officials make comments that will convince at least some East Europeans that it wants somehow to restore the old lines.

On Aug. 28, an article in Moscow's Komsomolskaya Pravda argued that the Baltic countries soon and even Ukraine later are likely to become members of NATO and other Western institutions. Moscow, the paper suggested, cannot stop this process, but it pointed out that it can render it relatively innocuous to Russian interests.

Indeed, the article said, President Vladimir Putin's talk about possible Russian membership in NATO is intended to make that alliance into something "absurd."If Russia is inside the Western alliance, the paper argued, the alliance would be transformed and by implication neutered as an institution that could in any way threaten Russia's national interests or even her geopolitical concerns.

On the same day, another Moscow newspaper, Nezavisimaya gazeta, reported on an ongoing military exercise by Russia and some members of the CIS. The paper said that the exercise posits conflicts between three fictional entities, "Northland,""Westland,"and "Southland."But standing behind these names are real forces and real countries, the paper said. And these reflect current Russian military thinking.

"Northland"includes Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. "Westland"includes the United States and NATO. And "Southland"includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajik guerrilla forces.

For purposes of this military game, the Russia-led "Northland"is the defender, and NATO's "Westland"and the Islamic "Southland"are the threats, the paper said.

The paper suggested that this maneuver, which was designed by Russian military planners, represents "a quixotic mix of anachronisms from the Cold War and elements of a brave new world."In short, it reflects the vision of some Russians that the old lines on the map have not so much been eliminated as obscured for a time.

Seven years after Moscow pulled its forces from German and Baltic soil, people on both sides of the old line are still struggling with that line and the new ones that are being drawn in the post-Cold War era.