Prospects for Ukraine after elections

  • 2010-02-18

Dear TBT,

According to Mr. J. Kulhanek, an employee at the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and Eastern European Studies at the University of Georgetown (U.S.), and Mr. M. Larish, a scientist at the Association of Foreign Affairs in Prague, after the first round of elections in Ukraine it became clear that the tendency to prompt rapprochement with Europe, which was supported by President Yushchenko, has settled itself.

Both presidential candidates (we will refer to them in this manner till March 17) are at variance concerning foreign policy issues: notably, V. Janukovich acts as the pro-Russian candidate, and J. Timoshenko, ex facte, looks [like] the westernized politician. Both candidates, nevertheless, have the possibility to keep Ukraine’s favor toward Europe as the foreign policy’s ultimate goal, simultaneously supporting rapprochement with Russia.

Irrespective of who would be declared by the Center electoral commission as the winner of election campaign, official Kiev, probably, will follow foreign policy under the balancing scenario between the West and Russia.
After the war in Georgia in 2008, neither Janukovich nor Timoshenko, taking into account their pretty cautious position concerning NATO, will aspire to membership in the military block. At the same time, both of them hope to come to a closer relationship with the European Union, clearly understanding the impossibility of Ukraine joining this Union during the five year period of their presidency.

After the second round of elections the EU once again has stated the possibility of Ukraine receiving membership in the European Union. The eventual cooperation agreement opens a prospect of profound political and economic cooperation and integration of Ukraine in the EU. Under the point of view of Official Kiev, the agreements “On free trade” and “On liberalization of the visa policy” could become desirable awards.

But Brussels operates on a political wicket, acting circumspectly on the interests of Russia, since approximately 80 percent of the Russian gas which is exported passes through the territory of Ukraine. Maintenance of the continuous inflow of gas is one of the paramount priorities of influential European politicians, and it directly raises interest in long-term political stability in Ukraine.

After Yushchenko’s resignation, Moscow can make an attempt to return to influence, which it lost after the Orange revolution of 2004. Russia does not consider any more membership of Ukraine in the EU as a comprehensible alternative to its introduction into NATO. At the current time Moscow looks at the EU positions in the near abroad with big suspicion.

In view of its interests, the EU will aspire to maintain relationships with Ukraine, and in Brussels it should already start considering of the actions in the conditions of a new political reality in this country. It is impossible to leave these two essential problems unobserved: first, EU promised to Ukraine its solid financial help in reconstruction of an out-of-date system of gas pipelines. Russia will probably also not manage completely to do without Ukraine as a gas trans-shipper, therefore the European Union should invite Russia to take part in the modernization of the pipeline system as a confidence-building measure between Brussels, Kiev and Moscow within the limits of the signed contracts between the EU and the Russian Federation about power safety in Europe.

Secondly, it is necessary for the European Union to pay great attention to a situation around the Black Sea fleet, because this issue, in the long term, becomes the basic foreign policy problem. The Russian navy fleet possibly could re-lease the naval base in Crimea in 2017. They probably will express a desire to remain there, and this can cause both intensity in the good neighborhood of two countries and split in the country on the Right (independent) and Left (considers relations from the Russian Federation in the spirit of a brotherhood). The EU should look attentively on development of the situation in the Crimea, if there will be a necessity to give a hand in settling newly arising differences, and in no way allow an increase in an aggressive policy by Turkey, realized through the Crimean Tatars, in this region.

Vyacheslav Samoshkin
St. Petersburg, Russia

 

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