TALLINN - A changed perception of threats has compelled the Kremlin to develop a new framework for the Baltic Sea region, enabling it to analyze regional challenges and provide Moscow's leadership with opportunities to exert influence, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service writes in its latest annual report.
While last year the agency detailed how Russia uses its academic and research institutions for shadow diplomacy in the West, this year's report examines how the Kremlin has decided to reassert itself in the Baltic Sea region using academic tools. Or, as it is now known in Moscow, the 'Baltic-Scandinavian macro-region'.
The concept of the Baltic-Scandinavian macro-region (BSM) - also known as 'Greater Balticum' - came into more active use in the Kremlin's corridors of power after the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine. A key driver was the changed perception of threats: for Russia, the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO marked a significant shift in the security landscape of the Baltic Sea region.
Another reason was the weakening of Russia's strategic position in the Baltic Sea: for instance, the country lost access to key regional cooperation formats such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Nordic Council of Ministers. These new circumstances compelled the Kremlin to devise a new framework for the Baltic Sea region to analyze its challenges and provide Moscow's leadership with ways to exert influence.
Thus, the BSM concept began to be spearheaded by the Directorate for Cross-Border Cooperation of the Presidential Administration of Russia, which has been managing and planning Kremlin policy in the Baltic states and Belarus since 2021. With the emergence of the BSM concept, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, and Poland were added to its list of targets in 2023.
Typically for the Kremlin, the directorate employs individuals with backgrounds in special services, and therefore uses methods characteristic of intelligence agencies to achieve its goals. This includes an extensive network of front organizations, which, among others, comprises seemingly independent Russian scientific and research institutions.
Accordingly, in 2022, the Directorate for Cross-Border Cooperation ordered Russian academic institutions to create research centers focused on the Baltic-Scandinavian macro-region to supply the administration with the necessary analyses. This was not the only directive: Russian researchers were also tasked with leveraging their connections among Baltic Sea scientists to re-establish contact with the region's policymakers.
The Presidential Administration's reach extends deep into the BSM network: both the research topics of BSM laboratories and the personnel participating in projects are coordinated with it. Analyses by BSM researchers and their reports on contacts with the scientific community in the Baltic Sea countries land first and foremost on the desks of Presidential Administration curators and special services.
This clearly demonstrates that the scientific work and academic interaction conducted within the BSM framework do not fall under the umbrella of conventional academic freedom: it is merely a facade behind which the Russian state apparatus purposefully advances its political ambitions, the agency stated.
One fruit of the BSM concept is the international discussion format known as the 'Baltic Platform,' under the guise of which the Kremlin attempts to revive relations with scientists, politicians, and local authorities in both the Baltic and Nordic countries. The initiative's logic is as follows: first, a dialogue is initiated between scientists on non-political matters, such as environmental problems in the Baltic Sea; then, the conversation gradually shifts to current political topics, such as the security architecture of the Baltic Sea and Europe, and the policy of sanctions against Russia.
However, the Kremlin's efforts with the 'Baltic Platform' have so far failed: in more than two years of operation, it has not managed to spark an active exchange of ideas between Russian and Baltic Sea scientists. As a result, Russian academics, holding a pariah status, mainly engage with each other on the 'Baltic Platform.' To lend the format a semblance of international legitimacy, scientists from Russia's vassal state, Belarus, have been included, along with 'experts' on Greater Balticum from China, India, and other countries.
By attempting to graft an international dimension onto this 'scientific cooperation,' Russia is trying to conceal the fact that there is virtually no new generation of experts in Russia with in-depth knowledge of the countries, languages, societies, and cultures of the Baltic Sea region.
All of Russia's international scientific cooperation initiatives are part of the Kremlin's influence apparatus, which is integrated with its special services. They have no connection whatsoever to conventional academic research and freedom. The same, of course, applies to the 'scientific cooperation' initiatives of the Baltic-Scandinavian macro-region: they in no way express a sincere Russian interest in the ecological well-being of the Baltic Sea region. Instead, the Kremlin is using this framework to find ways to reassert itself politically in the area. The scientific community loyal to Russia may, for this purpose, deliberately try to frighten the Baltic Sea community with scenarios of environmental catastrophes - all to make the region's countries understand the 'inescapable need' to communicate and cooperate with Russia to avoid the worst.
Western experts invited to a BSM conference or video meeting should be aware that Russian researchers will use the information obtained from them primarily for hostile purposes, namely to identify the vulnerabilities of the Baltic Sea countries and their allies. Participation would inevitably mean contributing to analyses that reach Kremlin officials, which often contain policy recommendations designed to harm the interests of the Baltic Sea region as well as the NATO and EU member states bordering the Baltic Sea.
For example, researchers from the BSM network have recommended that Russia: interfere in the domestic politics of the Baltic and Scandinavian countries; undermine their foreign, security, economic, and energy policies; accuse these countries of violating the human rights of Russian speakers and indigenous populations; and accuse them of persecuting the Russian Orthodox Church and falsifying history.
The best way to counter such influence activities is to completely avoid cooperation with Russian and Belarusian universities, research institutions, and expert networks. Paradoxically, however, Russia itself has created the most potent antidote to its own poison: by waging war against Ukraine, Russia has isolated itself and lost a significant portion of its Western contacts. Consequently, the 'BSM research vessel,' stranded in a corner of what has become a NATO lake, is already rusting and leaking.
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