Kapo: Extremism threat level remains low in Estonia

TALLINN - The threat level of extremism in Estonia remains low, and to maintain this, the Estonian Internal Security Service (Kapo) has focused primarily on prevention, the agency writes in its latest annual review.

"The biggest concern continues to be adolescents who feel lonely and find acceptance in international social media groups that promote extremism, where they are introduced to ideologies of hate and violence. Regular consumption of violent content normalizes violence, and behavioral patterns seen on social media are carried into real life. The adoption of extremist views is often explained by social background: experiences of trauma related to alcoholism, abuse, abandonment, and loneliness. Although social conditions are not a direct cause of radicalization, they are contributing factors. Young people who feel alone in the world seek a sense of belonging and understanding in these social media groups," Kapo stated.

Kapo explained that there are various types of extremism-inspired youths, with the most visible being those who verbally glorify extremist symbols and ideology. "However, there are also young people who radicalize inconspicuously-until they join an extremist group on social media. Acts of violence by school-aged adolescents can be prevented, and with the help of specialists, they can be guided back onto the right path. If a crime has already been committed or the person planning the act is an adult, it could be considered an act of terrorism, which is punishable by imprisonment from five years to life," Kapo noted.

Kremlin-influenced right-wing extremism

In April 2025, at the proposal of the Internal Security Service, the Police and Border Guard Board expelled Konstantin Gorlov from Estonia, whose activities posed a threat to the security of the Republic of Estonia and other Schengen member states. The Internal Security Service assessed that there was no doubt Gorlov would have acted in Russia's military interests in the event of Russian aggression.

Gorlov supported Russia's military and propaganda objectives and had contacts with individuals acting in the interests of Russian special services and the military. He attempted to establish a unit in Estonia that could be used for Russia's military interests. Modeled after the Ratibor fight club, which is associated with the Russian Imperial Legion, he founded the fight club Ratibor Estonia. Its training sessions included practice with bladed weapons and medical skills.

Gorlov is associated with Andrei Votsygin, the leader of the Ratibor fight club in Perm, Russia. Members of Votsygin's fight club are participating in Russia's aggression; among other things, they have a separate intelligence group in Ukraine. In addition to training in bladed weapon combat and military medicine, they recruit individuals for Russia's military aggression against Ukraine.

The Russian Imperial Legion is the military wing of the Russian Imperial Movement. The movement's fighters were active in Ukraine from 2014 to 2017 and later again in Bakhmut, where Russia committed war crimes. They have also operated in Syria, Libya, and Central Africa. The movement and the legion have a training center called Partizan, where activists are trained by former Spetsnaz and FSB officers. All three organizations use a media network to disseminate their messages, raise funds, and showcase their activities, including on the battlefield.

The Russian Imperial Movement has been added to the U.S. and Canadian lists of sanctioned terrorist organizations (Specially Designated Global Terrorist). The Russian Imperial Movement, the Russian Imperial Legion, and its leaders have also been added to the European Union's sanctions list.

Islamic extremism

In 2025, the main threat in Estonia was not coordinated attacks by large terrorist organizations, but rather lone radicalized individuals. The nature of the terrorist threat has changed. While Islamic extremists were previously clearly linked to a specific organization with a distinct ideology, these connections have now become more covert. The ideology is often vague, and individuals are not necessarily supporters of a particular terrorist organization or adherents to its full doctrine. Radicalizing young people often pick and choose elements they find appealing from the ideologies and narratives of various terrorist groups. Violent content is the most consumed type of material online.

Shiite extremism

Shiites living in Estonia follow religious authorities as part of their faith, including Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Among the active members of the Shiite community are some individuals who consume information influenced by the Iranian religious leader and view developments in the Middle East through the lens of Iranian narratives.

In 2025, Iran, both directly and through its proxy terrorist organization Hezbollah, organized terrorist attacks against Jews worldwide. Kapo assesses that disseminators and supporters of Iranian and Hezbollah ideology are dangerous and threaten public order and security in Estonia. Consequently, their residence permits were revoked, and the Police and Border Guard Board, in cooperation with the Internal Security Service, expelled two individuals on study mobility who were believed to be supporters of the terrorist group Hezbollah and Iran's Islamist regime. Terrorist networks operating in the Schengen free movement zone may engage in activities in Estonia, such as fundraising or the covert movement of people.

Kurdistan Workers' Party

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), founded in 1978 and active in areas of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, is recognized as a terrorist organization by Western countries. In December 2023, criminal proceedings were initiated against a Turkish citizen of Kurdish ethnicity for sharing a call on social media to join the party. In January 2026, the court found the individual guilty under a plea agreement and handed down a suspended sentence of 2 years and 6 months.

Future integration challenges

Over the past decade, the number of Muslim community members living in Estonia with residence permits has increased more than fivefold. This growth has been accompanied by pressure to establish Islamic kindergartens and schools. The experience of other countries shows that in extreme cases, the state has had to intervene and shut down such educational institutions due to their links to or funding from extremist organizations, where extremist ideologies are spread and young people are radicalized.

There are nearly 800 children in the Muslim community who should be attending Estonian schools. However, almost 20 percent are homeschooled or attend school in their country of origin. School education is crucial for helping young people integrate and prepare for life in Estonian society and its cultural sphere. Muslim religious symbols and practices are becoming more visible in the public space and could potentially create social tensions. Islamic symbols and customs are unfamiliar in the Estonian cultural context and may conflict with Estonian laws.