ISS: Russian special services are attempting to recruit visitors to Russia

TALLINN - The survival of the Kremlin-led authoritarian regime is supported by all of Russia's special services - the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). All three services gather intelligence on the intentions, capabilities, and activities of other countries and attempt to influence the actions of foreign decision-makers and public opinion through information and sabotage operations, the Estonian Internal Security Service (ISS) writes in its latest yearbook.

"The main operational method of all Russian special services against Estonia and other countries bordering Russia in the current circumstances is so-called 'intelligence from the territory.' Intelligence officers do not leave Russia, but instead actively attempt to recruit foreigners visiting the country. Operating from a limited territory, they work through social media applications, establishing connections with people, many of whom have never been to Russia or even seen their 'cooperation partner' face-to-face," the ISS noted.

Foreign politicians, officials, academics, and business delegations are visiting Russia less frequently. The primary intelligence interest of Russia's special services is focused on the military, economic, and diplomatic aid provided to Ukraine by Estonia and its allies. The aid to Ukraine has also been a target of sabotage operations organized by Russian special services, and attempts have been made in countries supporting Ukraine to damage infrastructure used for providing aid.

Residents of Estonia or third countries visiting Russia whom Russian special service officers attempt to recruit do not need to have access to classified information from their home country. Russia's special services are also interested in various types of non-classified information or activities that support intelligence operations, such as observing military units and convoys, taking photos and videos of them, monitoring construction work near border facilities, and damaging various objects.

Intelligence activities of the FSB Border Guard Service's operational department

"Based on recent years, we can point out that the FSB's Border Guard Service has shown particular activity, which we will write about in more detail this year. Among other intelligence units, the Border Guard Service, which is part of the FSB's structure, gathers intelligence on Estonia. The regional offices of the Border Guard Service, or border guard directorates, are located in the capitals of the oblasts on Russia's external border. Sub-units operating in the districts directly on the border are subordinate to them. In addition to units that patrol the border on land and water, the territorial units of the FSB Border Guard also include operational departments," the ISS noted.

According to the ISS, officers of the border guard's operational departments do not look like typical Russian border guards; they do not wear green uniforms, patrol the border, or use binoculars and service dogs, as border guards are usually imagined. Operational officers mostly work in plain clothes or use uniforms only to conceal their true purpose. The main task of the officers of the border guard's operational departments is to gather information in the border zone and on the other side of the border, in the foreign country. To this end, they recruit informants from among people crossing the border and later direct the activities of the recruits.

"The first contact with a potential agent takes place at the border crossing point, where officers ask people questions about the purpose of their trip, relatives living in Russia, and/or the address of their accommodation while in Russia. This information later allows the FSB to quickly locate the person. Since the beginning of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, border crossers have been asked, for example, for their opinion on Russia's ongoing 'special military operation' in Ukraine. For those border crossers who are of interest to the border guard's operational officers as potential sources and agree to cooperate, further meetings are arranged on Russian territory at pre-agreed locations and partly through social media communication applications," stated the ISS.

The ISS confirms that these meetings always take place outside the border crossing points. The FSB Border Guard Service's operational officers are interested in individuals involved in illegal activities, such as smugglers of contraband and sanctioned goods, or persons associated with organized crime. Also of interest are border crossers who are directly or indirectly connected with Estonian law enforcement agencies or strategically important institutions and companies.

"For example, family members of law enforcement employees, members of the Estonian Defence League who do not have clearance for state secrets and thus have no travel restrictions, individuals connected to Ukraine and the Russian-speaking population in border areas, as well as people who regularly cross the border for work, such as bus and truck drivers. Information is sought from these people about events in Estonia, as well as about other individuals whom Russian intelligence officers could recruit as agents. Naturally, the Russian border guard is currently interested in everything concerning Russia's aggression against Ukraine, Western support for Ukraine, and the situation of Ukrainians in Estonia," explained the ISS.

"Like many other Russian state institutions, the FSB and its Border Guard Service's operational departments are rife with abuse of office, including corruption. Recruited sources often pass on 'intelligence reports' to the officers working with them, and the latter to their superiors, which in reality contain insignificant or publicly known information. Such reports allow officers to demonstrate the effectiveness of their work and thereby receive recognition and bonuses," the yearbook noted.

According to the ISS, officers often pocket a portion of the money intended for paying informants. In addition to citizens of Estonia and other foreign countries, officers of the FSB Border Guard's operational departments also recruit Russia's own citizens, from whom information is expected about events in their own country, such as cross-border smuggling, corruption, drug trafficking, and opposition to the Kremlin. Those returning from abroad are expected to provide information about life in foreign countries and people of interest. The border guard's operational departments are also assisted by employees of other Russian state institutions and companies, who help search for information for the potential recruitment of foreign sources.

The Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine and the Russian special services' sabotage campaign in Western countries, which began on a smaller and more covert scale in the 2010s, have brought international cooperation between Western security agencies in combating the Russian threat to an entirely new level.

Cooperation between European security agencies is the best way to identify intelligence officers working in Russian embassies and their activities throughout the European Union. Information exchange and imposing an entry ban to the Schengen area on diplomats declared persona non grata helps prevent their return to other EU countries. Cooperation between European security agencies also helps to identify saboteurs recruited by Russia and operating in different countries, prevent their crimes, and apprehend and convict the perpetrators.