Baltic states and Finland best prepared in EU to counter Russian hybrid threats - former minister

RIGA - The Baltic states and Finland are the best prepared among the European Union (EU) member states to counter Russia's hybrid threats, said Marija Golubeva, former Latvian interior minister and now researcher at the Democratic Resilience Program of the the European Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA), in an article published on CEPA website.

She also commented on social media that Lithuania is the most prepared of the Baltic states, but that the overall preparedness of all three countries is relatively good.

In Golubeva's assessment, not all EU countries are ready to counter Russia's hybrid threats, but being close to Russia has led to greater awareness and preparedness in its closest neighbors. Due to their location and history of occupation, the Baltic states are perhaps the most aware of the threat of hybrid attacks and, after Finland, the best prepared to confront Russia, Golubeva believes.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania face a variety of threats, including sabotage against their defense capabilities and connectivity, such as repeated damage to undersea cables, a wide range of cyber threats and disinformation, as well as the use of migration as a weapon from Belarus, she points out.

Golubeva cites Chatham House researcher Keir Giles, who argues that Russia's pattern of activity in Europe includes not only actual acts of sabotage, but also reconnaissance, testing and situational awareness in both the physical and digital environment, focusing on communications, logistics and emergency management.

The expert stresses that Russia is testing its potential influence in Western-oriented countries, the response of governments and institutions, and the resilience of the public, which it deliberately pollutes with disinformation on a daily basis.

The experience of the Baltic countries shows that awareness of the threat does not necessarily mean readiness to confront it, but it does help to take political decisions more quickly to build resilience, Golubeva notes.

According to Golubeva, while most experts agree that the Baltic states are far ahead of many Western European regions in monitoring and countering hybrid threats, they are lagging behind in cooperation with each other. Understanding hybrid warfare trends could be improved by joint monitoring through the creation of something like a virtual information-sharing platform on hybrid threats in the region, Golubeva believes.

She points out that the Baltic administrations, although innovative in many respects, still mostly use a "top-down" approach to crisis management and civil protection organization. Finland and Ukraine, meanwhile, show that a better approach is to involve citizens from the bottom up, for example through local volunteer networks, she says.

Golubeva notes that she recently witnessed a tense discussion between a civil protection official and a local community volunteer while conducting training for municipal crisis managers and civil society in Latvia. The discussion was divided on how to respond to crises - local authorities saw it as working with the operational services, while local activists wanted a more clearly defined role and accessible communication channels to facilitate bottom-up information sharing. "This is not much, and such mechanisms should be established quickly if we want to ensure that 'whole of society engagement' is not just a slogan," says Golubeva.

Trust is another key factor in resilience to hybrid threats, says Golubeva, noting that in the Baltic atates, as elsewhere in Europe, Russian disinformation seeks to undermine people's trust in democratically elected governments.

In Latvia, the expert notes, there are additional challenges: local politicians in Latgale, which borders Belarus and Russia, sometimes use pro-Russian narratives in their public communications. This in turn creates a lack of trust in local or national authorities, depending on who the local population prefers as opinion leaders, the expert points out.

She says that during another crisis simulation exercise in Daugavpils, the head of an NGO told her, "Information exchange in a crisis is a matter of trust. We would not share it with our city authorities."

Golubeva notes that Latvian lawmakers are trying to mitigate such situations by introducing a requirement that, from summer 2025, municipal leaders will need a state secrets clearance. This move is seen as a defense mechanism against mayors inclined to support Russia, the expert says.

In Golubeva's view, the Baltic states, in close cooperation with the European Union (EU), have demonstrated their ability to take strategic steps to reduce their vulnerability to the Russian threat. One of the most visible examples, she says, has been the well-organized and successfully implemented disconnection from Russia's single electricity grid BRELL, which has reduced dependence on Russian electricity.

Even before the current joint efforts of the Baltic and Nordic NATO members to protect critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, experts argued that closer cooperation was needed to protect against underwater hybrid threats. Given the uncertainty surrounding NATO under the new US administration, an effective response in the future is unlikely without greater EU cooperation and investment, Golubeva said.

The Baltic states can set an example in a changing security landscape by taking bold steps to protect energy infrastructure and improve cyber security, as well as by taking steps to protect democratic institutions from Russian proxies.

"The resilience of Europe's security architecture to hybrid threats needs to be secured through joint efforts, and the Baltic states can continue to lead the way," says the expert.