Switching into the defensive democracy mode in the Baltics

  • 2025-01-20
  • Tõnis Saarts is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at Tallinn University (Estonia)

Because of Russian aggression against its neighbours and resurgent imperialism, the Baltic democracies have increasingly acquired very special features, making them "defensive democracies." So far, defensive democracies are known to exist in a very limited number of localities – literally in the "frontline countries" facing existential geopolitical threats by their big and aggressive neighbours or internal enemies. Israel has officially adopted this doctrine since the 1980s and is a prime example of a defensive democracy. Thus, the Baltic States have literally become the new Israels of the Baltic Sea region. 

Defensive democracy is a rare form of contemporary democracy that prioritizes existential and national security over democratic rights and liberties, but while doing so, it still adheres to the core principles of democracy. The doctrine asserts that in order to preserve the country's very existence and the democratic system itself, it may be necessary to curtail certain democratic freedoms and rights of specific social groups on some occasions.

 In the Baltic context, those "specific societal groups" are obviously the Russian-speaking minorities or Russian citizens. Since the outbreak of the war, all three Baltic states banned Russian media channels and restricted access to them. The governments have effectively curbed the freedom of assembly and association for the pro-Kremlin organizations and groups. There is a heated debate now in Estonia on whether to revoke the voting rights of Russian/Belarussian citizens and even non-citizens in the local municipality elections (Estonia has been the only Baltic country which has allowed all permanent residents to vote in local elections). At the same time, the Latvian government has adopted an increasingly hardline approach to the Russian citizens who live permanently in Latvia but have not so far cared to learn the local language and applied for residence permits. There is no sense in talking about the visa and entry policies and sending back some Russian citizens who might pose a security threat to the Baltic states. Overall, if all this could not be regarded as the restriction of some democratic freedoms and rights (media freedom, freedom of assembly, mobility and residence) in their purest and most idealistic sense, what is it?   

The second feature of a defensive democracy is that because the very existence of the country and democratic order is depicted as being under constant threat, the securitization of various policy areas and societal domains gradually becomes a new normality and necessity. In international relations, "securitization" is defined as the process in which state actors transform subjects from regular political issues into matters of "security", justifying the extraordinary means to encounter those new threats. One must be blind not to see how the securitization of several social/policy domains has been in full swing in the Baltics since spring 2022: energy policy (all three Baltic States), memory policy and monuments (in all three, again), education and language policy (Estonia and Latvia), policies of religion (the status of the Russian Orthodox Church), voting rights (Estonia), residence policy (Latvia), media policy (all three Baltic states), infrastructure policy (the Rail Baltic), etc. Indeed, in many areas, securitization has been inevitable. However, we must also be aware of its possible long-term negative consequences: it will primarily affect the quality of public debate because if the policy domain is already securitized, there is only one "right" solution – all the rest could be conveniently brushed aside as "Kremlin-minded".   

The third characteristic trait of defensive democracies is that in the public discourses, the individuals are very often divided into three groups: loyal and patriotic citizens (mostly nationalist right-wing parties and their supporters), so-called "suspicious citizens", and outright enemies (openly pro-Kremlin political actors). The most interesting and contest category is the "suspicious citizens". In the Baltic context, some very incompatible political actors and social groups may find themselves in that category: moderate (but allegedly pro-Western) Russians, some left-wing parties or intellectuals being maybe too lenient to the Kremlin or local Russians, the right-wing populists (talking about "peace" and admiring Orbán's Hungary), etc. The risks to the democratic quality arise if we allow some opportunistic politicians and demagogues to push the category "suspicious citizens" too wide.

Those three features of defensive democracies mentioned above were not invented by me. If one follows the academic literature on Israel, all those traits have characterized Israeli democracy for many decades. However, so far, very few authors dare to classify Israel as an authoritarian regime, but they certainly treat it as a "special kind of democracy". The same might be increasingly true for the Baltic states. The quality of the Baltic democracy will increasingly depend on how much we manage to prevent the populists or some power-hungry politicians from pushing those three traits of defensive democracies into the extremes and keeping our common sense and democratic instincts regardless of the overwhelming security threats and concerns.