Russian activities in information space must be treated seriously, but their impact must not be exaggerated - Constitutional Protection Bureau

RIGA - Russia's activities in the information space should be treated seriously, as they are one of the indicators that may indicate Russia's intentions to escalate the situation, but at the same time the impact of such activities should not be exaggerated, the Constitutional Protection Bureau (SAB) has pointed out in its latest information and analytical article.

One of the most common manifestations of Russia's hybrid warfare in Latvia and the Baltic States is propaganda and disinformation and the associated information operations. These information operations aim to influence, or even change, the target audience's values and beliefs in a way that favors Russia. Russia's actions concerning Ukraine corroborate this, the SAB explains.

Before the full-scale invasion, extensive information campaigns sought to influence Ukrainian society, reducing its readiness to resist and making Russia appear more appealing. Therefore, Russian information campaigns are an indicator that can signal an escalation of relations, including, in their ultimate form, a readiness to use military aggression to achieve their goals.

However, when assessing Russia's information activities and their effectiveness, it's necessary to consider their intensity, the content of their messages, and their intended audiences, the SAB reminds.

The bureau has concluded that compared to the period before Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the aggressiveness and intensity of Russian propaganda and disinformation directed at Latvia have increased.

When analyzing Russia's influence activities against Latvia, SAB pays particular attention to the content and aggressiveness of the disseminated propaganda and disinformation. Most messages are reactive, with Russia responding to Latvia's decisions and statements.

Over the past three years, SAB has observed no new trends in Russian messages; instead, they have become part of existing disinformation trends. These largely include accusations of historical revisionism, promoting and using Russophobia and discriminatory measures, political aggression against Russia, and short-sighted submission to a Western-dictated political course.

In some cases, Russia's information influence activities are also proactive. These often align with historically significant dates or events for Russia, as Russia seeks to proactively prepare the information space.

Russian information activities are not static; they are characterized by their ability to adapt and utilize topics relevant to different audiences for greater effect. The intensity of Russian disinformation is high but stable, maintaining its consistently high level, the SAB points out.

Every month, dozens of publications and statements by Russian officials, and Kremlin propagandists are directed, directly or indirectly, against Latvia. For instance, Russian state institutions, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are increasingly focusing on Latvia in various reports, falsely disseminating messages about the oppression of the Russian-speaking population and the resurgence of Nazism.

Viewing information influence activities as a potential indicator of escalation or confrontation, it should be noted that a significant increase in intensity is observed and expected in such situations. In this way, Russia tries to use the information space to influence the views of the target audience, such as their readiness and willingness to oppose Russia.

Some of Russia's developed messages are aimed at the Russian domestic audience. This allows Russia to construct the image of an external enemy and a sense of threat, influencing public opinion.

In the context of the domestic audience, it's worth highlighting the most prominent propaganda mouthpieces, such as V. Solovyov. Such broadcasts and publications often contain not only aggressive but also dramatic messages about current events, which can raise concerns about Russia's readiness to act, while also testing the Russian public's reaction and support.

However, such broadcasts and statements made in them must be viewed critically. These broadcasts follow commercial logic, meaning that generating hype is based on the need to attract attention, which stimulates the development of increasingly dramatic messages. In addition, they also have political significance - against the backdrop of such extravagant personalities and statements, V. Putin appears moderate and rational, which helps develop his public image and thus garner support for his position.

At the same time, a large portion of messages are also targeted at audiences outside Russia. This audience, in turn, can be divided into several subcategories.

One such audience comprises compatriots living abroad and pro-Russian individuals. This audience already supports Russia's policies, and a change in their views is not necessary. Russia often uses representatives of this audience - various pro-Russian activists - in the creation and dissemination of propaganda and disinformation.

In the long term, Russia almost certainly hopes that its information influence activities will also reach the international community. Its goal is for the international community to put pressure on Latvia to change its policy towards Russia, the SAB believes.

Another separate target group is Latvian society. Although Russia currently cannot directly and significantly influence public opinion, it tries to do so in various more hidden ways, for example, by emphasizing Latvia's economic problems and trying to highlight any other shortcomings, thereby discrediting and weakening the Latvian state.

Given Russia's goals and motivation, it's necessary to critically weigh the response to such actions so as not to give them undeserved attention and an increase in publicity, which would polarize the opinions of Latvian society, the SAB points out.

Activities in the information space must be handled responsibly, as it is one of the indicators that can signal Russia's intentions to escalate the situation, as the example of Ukraine also confirms. This justifies the need to track Russia's activities to prepare for potential actions in a timely manner.

At the same time, the significance, impact, and potential consequences of such activities should not be overstated, as this can create unwarranted anxiety and, in fact, amplify Russia's messages.

It should be added that activities in the information space are one of many indicators of intentions; therefore, SAB also monitors other Russian activities to detect changes in the threat level in a timely manner and issue warnings.

Regarding the overall security situation in our region, SAB maintains its current view: currently, while Russia's military resources are concentrated in Ukraine, the probability of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO is low. However, if the war in Ukraine were to be "frozen" and the armed forces no longer suffered significant military losses in active combat, the Russian military threat to NATO would significantly increase.

Russia could implement plans to increase military forces towards NATO's northeastern flank, including the Baltics, within approximately a 5-year period, the SAB points oiut.