German defense manufacturer: Baltic Sea cables could be protected with underwater drones

TALLINN - Sabotage of infrastructure cables in the Baltic Sea cannot be prevented at present due to a lack of continuous monitoring, but underwater drones offer a solution, Verineia Codrean, Head of Strategy and Partnerships at German unmanned underwater vehicle manufacturer Euroatlas, said in an interview with Postimees.

"The need to protect our underwater infrastructure has grown, and it's also clear how little it is monitored, which is why the underwater drone was developed. A persistent grey zone has emerged where navies or defense ministries cannot intervene until an active act of sabotage takes place," said Codrean.

The Greyshark drones are multi-purpose, can remain submerged for long periods, and can switch tasks as needed without having to be retrieved from the water. "You can send it on a reconnaissance mission, moving very slowly and simply gathering information. As soon as it detects something suspicious, it is authorized to act," Codrean stated.

This depends on the specific mission: it could be a simple pursuit, an inspection of a suspicious object, or, in some cases, an intervention.

"Yes, it is possible to arm them, but it is crucial that a human remains in control, even with an autonomous system. For example, the drone can be given a specific instruction not to destroy, but perhaps to inflict enough damage to prevent a vessel from carrying out its destructive work," Codrean explained.

Euroatlas is in the final stages of negotiations with three Nordic-Baltic countries, with contracts close to being signed. This aims to solve the problem of the Russian shadow fleet, which has damaged critical cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea on numerous occasions.

While she could not disclose a specific price, Codrean said the underwater drones are significantly cheaper than combat patrol vessels, let alone actual submarines. The drone has no crew on board and is fully automated. "Based on our discussions with the region's defense ministries, we confidently predict the drones will be in the water by early 2027," Codrean estimated.

The strategy that some countries are beginning to adopt, according to Codrean, provides a missing layer that will effectively prevent future attacks: situational awareness before something is broken or an anchor accidentally severs a cable.

"Even if these malicious vessels do nothing, having 'eyes on the seabed' is a deterrent in itself. Simply knowing they are being watched makes them reconsider their next move. Persistent situational awareness is the missing layer in the strategy to prevent these attacks," Codrean said.

According to Codrean, using autonomous vehicles to prevent attacks would also avoid the excessive costs and dangers associated with operations to intercept ships.

"The advantage of drones is their ability to cover a large area without endangering human life, to interpret all the data, spot an intruder without taking direct action, and simply notify the authorities," she said.

In Codrean's view, the damage to sea cables is just a small part of an ongoing hybrid war at sea, on land, and in the air. Some of these attacks are so ambiguous that it's impossible to identify the culprit or to intervene because the threat is not explicitly illegal.

"These attacks are happening all over Europe; they are not isolated incidents. In essence, they are testing where Europe will draw the line," said Codrean, adding that a coordinated attack could be catastrophic for society.

"We don't have a clear picture of what the actual consequences would be. You wouldn't be able to withdraw money. You wouldn't be able to use any services in our digital society," Codrean warned.

She says that Europe's philosophy of ensuring peace through cooperation has undergone a U-turn. Now, peace can only be achieved through deterrence. Future attacks, according to Codrean, could become even more complex and difficult to attribute. "We need to create persistent maritime situational awareness-not just when something is spotted in the water, but at all times," she said, adding that this should be integrated into Nordic-Baltic cooperation.

"Most of the seabed infrastructure is static, very extensive, and rarely monitored unless something happens. Autonomous systems are not a silver bullet or a single strategy; they are essentially about seeing the part of the picture that has been missing," Codrean concluded.